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Introduction

The seller-consumer relationship is as old as commerce itself, yet
the idea that the judiciary should assume anything other than a passive
role toward the interests of buyer or seller in the consumer marketplace is of much more recent vintage.1 A conveniently latinate
phrase, caveat emptor, was used in many English and American decisions during the nineteenth century to refer to the assumption that a
court should adopt a truly laissez faire attitude toward the fairness of
any contract which came before it.2 A number of American legal
scholars, beginning early in this century, have argued for the creation
of a dual system of contract law, in which courts would approach contracts between businessmen in the traditional laissez faire manner
while adopting a much more interventionist attitude toward contracts
where a consumer, meaning a purchaser for household or personal end
use, was involved.3 However, with the exception of only a few deci1. Historically, English and American courts adhered to a policy of noninterference with the nature of a bargain struck between legally competent parties. Certainly
it is agreed that such was the dominant judicial attitude during the periods of growth
and development of the capitalist economies of the two nations. J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, CONTRACTS 4-6 (1970); 6A A. CoRaIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTs 20-21 (1962);
Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 373-74 (1921). This idea
was celebrated and immortalized by Sir Henry Maine who stated that "the movement

of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from status to contract." H.
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (1873). Almost as often quoted by contract scholars as
being expressive of the prevailing nineteenth century judicial sentiment is this passage
from Sir George Jessel, writing in Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson,
L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875): "If there is one thing which more than any other public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have
the utmost liberty of contracting, and that contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held good and shall be enforced by Courts of justice."
2. For numerous examples and an entertaining critique on the legitimacy of the
use of the phrase see Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J.
1133, 1175-81 (1931).
3. See, e.g., Kessler, Contractsof Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943); Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and
Society, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 699 (1936), 37 COLUM. L. REv. 341 (1937); Patterson,
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sions, our courts until recently have abstained from openly policing
consumer transactions. Thus it is not surprising that the law of "consumer protection," which is designed to insure consumers more equitable treatment in the seller-consumer relationship, is primarily statutory.4
In this country, the power of the judiciary to restructure and intervene in legal relationships through application of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is both awesome and protean.
However, this power has not been exercised in the consumer field until quite recently. While at one time American courts used the due
process clause to strike down legislation affecting several aspects of
commerce, the areas of such intervention were primarily labor relations and the production process; and even this use of the due process
clause is generally considered a relic of the past and of only historical
interest.5 With the 1969 decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.,6 however, the United States Supreme Court took an initial, but
extremely large, step toward injecting the requirements of the due
process clause as a new consideration in the seller-consumer relationship. In Sniadach, the Court held that prejudgment wage garnishments without a judicial hearing violated the due process rights of the
consumer defendant. The holding and rationale of the case have
received truly extensive comment during the past five years, and the
litigation and debate of the issues raised by the decision will undoubt7
edly continue.
The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 HAv. L. Rav. 198, 222 (1919); Llewellyn,
Book Review, 52 Hnv. L. REv. 700 (1939).
4. Statutes do indeed abound in the field. Three major, and quite well known
enactments on the federal level are the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1451-61 (1970); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (1970); and the Fair
Credit Reporting At, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t (1970).
5. See generally B. ScHwARTz, CONSnTTUToNAL LAw 165-68 (1972). A clear
and unequivocal announcement that the "substantive due process" theory under which
the Supreme Court struck down regulatory legislation appears is no longer accepted
appears in Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423-25 (1952). In this
connection note Justice Black's admonition that the Supreme Court is ushering in a
new era by resurrecting the notion of substantive due process to protect property rights
in his vigorous dissent in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 356 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting). As will be discussed in the second installment of this article,
the author believes that Justice Black's point in this regard has some validity.
6. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
7. The number of legal articles and lower court decisions generated by the Sniadach decision is so voluminous as to defy attempts at citation. The United States Supreme Court has considered issues raised by the decision in three subsequent cases:
D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), Swarb v. Lennos, 405 U.S.
191 (1972) and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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We shall not be concerned here with Sniadach or with prejudgment creditor seizures of property, but with another subject in the law
of consumer protection in which due process requirements may be
vital, the class action. Although this procedure is neither new nor
designed specifically for the use and protection of consumers, its continued use as a vehicle for consumer relief is gravely threatened by
a recent judicial application of the due process clause. Since many
commentators view the existence of the consumer class action as truly
vital to effective consumer protection, it is wise to give first priority
to its consideration.
As we examine the relationship between the due process clause
and procedural and substantive issues in consumer protection, a number of themes will be seen to appear and reappear. The first and
most prevalent is the need for development of new analytic concepts
for use by the courts in considering the application of the due process
clause. A major problem, as here perceived, is the clash between outdated concepts and new realities, a common source of difficulty in constitutional law. Depending on one's point of view, the concepts are
either outmoded or immutable, while the realities are either insistent
or transitory. It is both fair and accurate to say that the courts generally have not ignored the problem, but have begun the process of
formulating new and needed concepts and are thus continuing their
constant reinspection of society, one of the primary activities of any
judiciary in performing its institutional function. This article contends
that this process indeed has begun and argues for a more conscious,
thorough and expeditious approach.
A second general theme, already intimated above, is that new
substantive rights for consumers are emergent in recent judicial applications of the due process clause. Substantive due process is, in some
minds, an idea whose time has passed. A case will be made here,
however, for the proposition that a new concept of substantive due
process concerned with the protection of elemental property rights is
nascent in recent Supreme Court decisions. This theme constitutes
an evolution in the Court's thinking and cannot be perceived without
resort to that most intriguing scholarly pastime, analyzing the Court's
collective mind, in the sense of attempting to sort out the underlying
rationales for the Court's newly found concern for the American consumer qua consumer. This activity is well worth undertaking, yet it
carries with it possibilities for error and inanity. The risks are
accepted here.
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The third, and final, theme is that some discussion of the economics involved in the legal issues considered in this article is valuable.
A belief that economic analysis has a place in the resolution of legal
issues reflects the thinking seen in the proliferating body of literature
in the field of law-economics studies. The type of economic analysis involved is not of a technical nature, and the focus upon the policy
which naturally flows from any discussion of economics will, it is
hoped, be helpful to the reader.
Class Actions and Due Process
A. The Issues and Problems Involved
Class actions in the federal court are authorized specifically by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,8 and many states have statutory
authorizations for class action procedures. The class action has been
viewed as an ideal, and perhaps the only truly appropriate, vehicle
of relief for abused consumers and other groups who suffer "mass
wrongs," where damages suffered by the individuals in the group are
small. 9 In such cases, due to the large number of victims, the aggregate damage is often quite large. In the usual consumer abuse situation, such as a false advertisement with national or regional circulation, this large aggregate damage directly benefits the wrongdoing party through inflated sales and profits. This fact, coupled with the small
individual damage amount and resultant lack of economic incentive
to the injured consumer to bring suit, results in a grotesque situation;
a wrongdoer has a large economic incentive to plunder consumers by
such means as false advertising, with the expectation that only a few
victims would or could bring suit against him.
Class actions which permit aggregation of damages in mass wrong
situations, assuming a "commonality" of the facts establishing liability
for the harm to each individual, have been used more and more frequently in recent years by such groups as shareholders,' 0 overcharged
victims of antitrust violations, 1 environmentalists"2 and abused conH.

8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
9. State and federal courts alike have noted the appropriateness of class actions
for relief of mass wrongs. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y.
1968); Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1967).
10. E.g., Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dolgow v. Anderson,
43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
11. E.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452
(E.D. Pa. 1968); Siegal v. Chicken Delight, 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
12. E.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973); In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
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sumers.13 However, since the revision of Rule 23 in 1966, a number
of questions relating to the constitutionality of certain procedures used
by lower courts in class action cases have arisen. The resolution of
the most important of these questions is now imminent, and, ironically, the decision which is forcing these issues was rendered in a case
which previously had generated a number of extremely liberal and
nurturing decisions interpreting and applying Rule 23.
The decision in question is Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,4 decided in May, 1973 and popularly known as Eisen IH. It is the most
recent opinion in a complex course of litigation which commenced in
the Southern District of New York in 1966. The Eisen III court made
determinations on the following issues: (1) What types of notice to
absentee class members is sufficient to bind them, under res judicata
principles, by a final judgment? (2) Can the costs of such notice
be allocated between the parties? and (3)
What methods are permissible for computing and distributing damages in a class action?
It is the author's contention that the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in analyzing these issues
failed to give adequate consideration to two relevant and important
theories: (1) the evolving constitutional right of meaningful access
to the courts, 15 and (2) the therapeutic benefits of class actions. 16
Both of these theories are firmly based upon the realities of the common "mass wrong' consumer abuse situation, where the victims are
neither aware of their rights nor do they have an economic incentive
to bring individual legal actions. Both theories require the judiciary
to break away from casting the procedural requirements of the due
process clause on the mold of the traditional concept of civil litigation
13.

E.g., Basch v. Talley Industries, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y.

1971) (fraud);

Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 52 F.R.D. 510 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (consumer credit).
14. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 908 (1973). On May
28th, 1974, while the present article was in galley form, the Supreme Court rendered an
opinion affirming the Second Circuit decision. The Supreme Court's opinion can, at
present, be found only at 42 U.S. Law Week 4804. The Supreme Court's opinion is
discussed extensively in the Author's Note following footnote 206 of this article at page
1405, inlra. It should be mentioned at this point that the Supreme Court's opinion is

extremely narrow in its holdings and is based exclusively on a "strict construction" of
the present language of Rule 23. Thus, only a small portion of the text of this article,
specifically the text accompanying footnotes 167-172 and 185-188, is superseded by the
Supreme Court's decision. The Author's Note, infra, specifically deals with the effect

of the Supreme Court's opinion on the views expressed in this article regarding the
crucial and still unresolved issue of the requirements of the due process clause and class
action procedures.
15. See text accompanying notes 102-137 inlra.
16. See text accompanying notes 64-101 inlra.
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as involving one or more legally aware and financially self-sufficient
plaintiffs suing one or more similarly aware and fully financed defendants. This traditional concept is obviously inappropriate to the realities of the contemporary consumer's situation and should be altered
to conform to those realities.

Our discussion of Eisen will begin with a brief description of the
Eisen litigation and the Eisen III decision. Next, the evolving constitutional right to meaningful participation in the litigation process,
and the therapeutic benefits theory of class actions, will be examined.
Finally, the Eisen III decision will be analyzed in some depth, and
evaluated in terms of its responsiveness to these two theories.' 7
B. The Eisen Litigation and Eisen M

In 1966 Morton Eisen filed an antitrust suit on behalf of himself
and all other "odd-lot stock investors" against the major odd-lot
dealers on the New York Stock Exchange and against the Exchange
itself. The suit alleged that the dealer-defendants had violated the

Sherman Act by conspiring to monopolize the odd-lot business and by
'18
fixing prices in the form of an excessive "odd-lot differential.
Eisen also alleged that the Exchange had breached its federal statutory

duty to regulate odd-lot trading. 19 He purported to represent a class
numbering approximately six million odd-lot investors, and claimed
damages ranging at different points in the litigation, between $22 mil17. See text accompanying notes 138-206 infra.
18. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). "Odd-lots"
and "odd-lot differentials" are explained in the first Eisen opinin, id. at 148, and in
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 559 (2d Cir. 1968) (Eisen 11). Stocks
traded on the New York Stock Exchange are normally bought and sold in "round lots"
of 100 shares. A sale and purchase of fewer than 100 shares is called an "odd-lot"
transaction. These transactions are handled exclusively "by special odd-lot dealers
who buy and sell for their own account as principals." 391 F.2d at 559. On behalf
of the purchaser, a brokerage firm places an order with the odd-lot dealer. The price
paid by the customer includes the selling price of the stock, the broker's commission,
and a charge by the odd-lot dealer known as the "odd-lot differential." The differential
is computed by multiplying the number of shares involved in the transaction by a specified fraction of a dollar, expressed as a fraction of a "point." The fraction to be used
in any given transaction varies according to the price per share of the stock involved.
Thus, for example, if the transaction involved stock selling at $30 per share, the prescribed fraction was 1/8 of a point, or 12 1/20. If 50 shares of the stock were involved, the odd lot differential was 12%0 x 50 shares, or $6.25.
Eisen alleged that the two odd-lot firms of Carlisle & Jacquelin and DeCoppet
& Doremus, who shared 99 percent of the volume of odd-lot trading, had conspired to
monopolize the odd-lot industry and to fix an excessive odd-lot industry and to fix an
excessive odd-lot differential in violation of the Sherman Act. 41 F.R.D. at 148.
19. Id.
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lion2 ° and $120 million. 2'
The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the suit
as a class action on three grounds: 22 First, the claim of the named
party in relation to the total class claim was too small to insure that
he would be an adequate representative of the class ;23 second, issues
common to class members did not predominate over individual issues; 24 third, plaintiff wa unable to satisfy the notice requirements
of Rule 23.25 On appeal, in the decision popularly known as Eisen
I (also often referred to as the "death-knell" opinion),26 the Second
Circuit held that the initial determination by the district court that the
20. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
21. 479 F.2d at 1009.
22. 41 F.R.D. at 152.
23. Id. at 150-51. One of the four basic showings which must be made before
a class action can be maintained is that the representative party "will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4).
24. 41 F.R.D. at 152.
25. Id. at 151-52.
26. 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
An understanding of the procedure followed under Rule 23 is crucial to an understanding of
the "death knell doctrine" and of the significance of Eisen I. Rule 23 contemplates
a bifurcated procedure for class actions. Before holding a hearing on the substantive
merits of the claim, the court must determine whether the suit is maintainable at all
on a class basis, i.e., whether the requirements set forth in Rule 23(a) and (b) for
a class action have been met. A hearing is normally held at which evidence relevant
to this determination is presented. This "maintenance hearing" is held pursuant to
Rule 23(c)(1).
Once it has been determined that the suit is maintainable as a class
action, a hearing on the merits may be held.
The Eisen I decision determined, as the result of a maintenance hearing, that the
suit could not be maintained on a class basis. The merits of Eisen's claim were not
considered, and he was permitted to continue the suit on an individual basis.
Eisen appealed to the Second Circuit. Before adressing itself to the issue of the
propriety of the dismissal of the suit as a class action, the appellate court was forced
to consider the question whether such dismissal was an appealable order-a question
going to the very jurisdiction of the Second Circuit to consider the appeal. In Eisen
I, the Second Circuit concluded that the dismissal was appealable, and thus that it had
jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the dismissal. In so ruling, the court conceived
and invoked the "death knell doctrine": to deny appealability to the dismissal of the
class action would, for all practical purposes, end the lawsuit. "[N]o lawyer of competence is going to undertake this complex and costly case to recover $70 for Mr. Eisen."
370 F.2d at 120. The Second Circuit concluded, therefore, that the dismissal of the
class action was a "final" order as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) conferring appellate jurisdiction of all "final" orders of the district courts.
Defendants sought, and were denied, a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court
after Eisen 1. 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). The Supreme Court has since, however, granted
certiorari to Eisen, to review Eisen 111. 414 U.S. 908 (1973). Its decision may well
turn on a delayed consideration of the death knell doctrine, and avoid altogether a resolution of the crucial issues discussed in this article. See note 63 & accompanying text
infra.
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suit was not maintainable as a class action was an appealable order.
Subsequently, in Eisen 1,27 the Second Circuit vacated the district
court's initial denial of the class action and remanded "for further findings necessary for the class action determination. ' 28 On remand the
district court, Harold R. Tyler, presiding, determined that a class action
was maintainable. 2 9 However, the Second Circuit once again reversed
in the Eisen III decision."0
In holding the class action maintainable, Judge Tyler attempted
to answer some of the constitutional and statutory interpretation questions which have arisen under revised Rule 23. First, he held that
the requirement of Rule 23 that notice be given to all class members
of their right to opt out of the class could be satisfied by giving individual notice to a relatively small portion of the identifiable class members, and published notice to the rest."- Second, he held that part
of the notice cost could be allocated to the defendant, conducted a
"preliminary mini-hearing on the merits" to determine what that allocation should be, 2 and concluded that since it was likely that plaintiff would prevail in the case, defendants should bear 90 percent of
the costs of notice. 3 Third, he invoked the "fluid class recovery" conthat the class action would otherwise
cept as a solution to the problem
34
have been "unmanageable.1
36
35
In an opinion that has been called "frosty" and "withering,"
the Second Circuit reversed all of these holdings. The Second Circuit
determined: (1) that Rule 23(c)(2) requires individual opt-out notice to be sent to each of the two million class members who could
27. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
28. Id. at 570.
29. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
30. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
31. 52 F.R.D. at 265-68. Opt-out notice notifies absentee class members of their
right to exclude themselves from the class by notifying the court. The significance of
this is that those class members who exclude themselves will thereby avoid the res judicata effect which would otherwise attach, under Rule 23(c) (3), to a judgment in the
action.
32. 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
33. Id. The balance of notice costs were allocated to plaintiff.
34. 52 F.R.D. at 264-65. A class action such as that prosecuted by Eisen must
be "manageable" under Rule 23. The argument that Eisen's suit was unmanageable
was made by Judge Lombard in his dissent from Eisen 11. See text accompanying
notes 189-90 infra. For a discussion of fluid class recovery as a solution to the manageability problem see text accompanying notes 189-206 infra.
35. Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87
HARv. L. REv. 426, 433 (1973).
36. Andrews, The Morton Eisen Case: Granddaddy of Them All, Junis DocToR,
Jan. 1974, at 20.
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be identified with reasonable effort; 7 (2) that there is no authority
in Rule 23 for allocating any portion of the costs of notice to a defendant and Judge Tyler's mini-hearing held for that purpose was improper;3 8 and (3) that neither Rule 23 nor the Constitution permits
the use of fluid class recovery as a device to meet the requirement
of Rule 23 that the class action be manageable. 9 A brief description
of the Second Circuit's opinion will be presented at this point, while
a more thorough analysis is given below.4 0
In regard to the first holding, Judge Tyler had ordered individual
notice to the two thousand class members who had had ten or more
odd-lot transactions, and to five thousand other class members selected
at random from the approximately two million who could be identified
from the records of the defendants. 4 ' As to the balance of the class
(1,993,000 members), he ordered published notice and specified
which newspapers should be used, the frequency of publication of
notice, and the size of the notices. 42 The Eisen III court, noting both
Judge Tyler's "complete disregard of our specific and unambiguous
[prior] ruling [in Eisen II] on the subject of actual individual notice
to identifiable members of the class"43 and the requirement of Rule
23(c)(2) of "individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort, ' 44 summarily reversed Judge Tyler's elaborate notice order.4 5
Judge Medina treated the allocation of notice costs and the preliminary mini-hearing as separate issues and noted explicit instructions in
Eisen II that plaintiff was to bear notice costs.4 6 On that basis, he
reversed Judge Tyler's allocation of 90 percent of the notice costs to
defendant.4 7 As to the preliminary mini-hearing on the merits, Judge
Medina observed that
neither in amended Rule 23 nor in any other rule do we find provision for any tentative, provisional or other makeshift determination of the issues of any case on the merits for the avowed purpose of deciding a collateral matter such as which party is to be
37. 479 F.2d at 1015.
38. Id. at 1015-16.
39. Id. at 1017-18.
40. See text accompanying notes 138-206 infra.
41. 52 F.R.D. at 267-68.
42. Id. at 268.
43. 479 F.2d at 1015.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 391 F.2d at 568.
47. 479 F.2d at 1015-16.
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required to pay for mailing,
publishing or otherwise giving any
48
notice required by law.
Expressing a fear that the "tentative findings and conclusions arrived
at without the salutary safeguards applicable to all full scale trials on
the merits will be extremely prejudicial to one or the other of the parties, '49 the court rejected this procedure as well. Judge Medina saw
other problems with the mini-hearing: First, it "does violence to the
whole concept of summary judgment"; 50 second, it "cannot be reconciled with the requirement in Rule 23 that 'as soon as practicable after
the commencement of the action' the question of class suit vel non
be decided"; 5 1 and third, the procedure was invoked by the trial court
52
without jurisdiction.
Finally, the Eisen III court rejected the use of the fluid class recovery device. 53-The basis for this ruling is ambiguous, but the
Second Circuit clearly felt that Judge Tyler's authorization of fluid
class recovery was unsupported by valid precedent. 54 Judge Tyler
cited the settlement of the Drug Cases55 as one "respectable precedent," but this was distinguished by the Second Circuit on the grounds
that procedures appropriate to a "consensual affair" are rn-fitted to
the solution of problems where every issue is "contested and litigated."' V Judge Tyler's reliance on Bebchick v. Public Utilities Commission57 was held to be inappropriate because Bebchick was not a
class action and because the victims of the unlawful rate increase by
the public utility could not have been identified.5 8 Finally, Daar v.
Yellow Cab Co.,59 a state class action case relied on by Judge Tyler,
was distinguished on the ground that it involved a state class action
statute unlike Rule 23 and because its procedural stance was different
from that in Eisen. 90
48. Id. at 1015.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1016.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1017-18.
54. Id. at 1012. For a discussion of the ambiguous nature of the basis for this
holding see text accompanying notes 189-206 infra.
55. West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), affd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) (sometimes
referred to as The Drug Cases).
56. 479 F.2d at 1012.
57. 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963).
58. 479 F.2d at 1012.
59. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
60. 479 F.2d at 1012. The treatment of the Daar decision by the Second Circuit
is examined more closely below. See text accompanying notes 201-06 infra.
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After the Eisen III decision, the Second Circuit denied a petition

for a rehearing en banc over a sharp dissent by Judge Oakes. 6 Certiorari has been granted by the United States Supreme Court and a
decision can be expected at an early date. 62 In its order, however,
the Court requested the parties to brief and argue the jurisdiction of

the Court of Appeals.

This is a reference to the conclusion of the

Second Circuit in the "death-knell" opinion that the original denial of
the suit on a class basis was appealable. The Court may choose to
avoid the issues outlined in this article by concluding that the "deathknell" doctrine is invalid, and that Eisen I1 and Eisen III therefore
were decided without jurisdiction.63 Should the Court elect to follow
such a course, it may well be years before these important issues are

finally resolved.
C.

Important Theories Ignored in the Eisen

I Decision

1. The Therapeutic Benefits Theory of Class Actions
(a) The Lawyer's Rationale
Occasionally "mass wrong" class actions have been justified by
61. 479 F.2d at 1021-26 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
62. 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
Oral argument was heard by the Supreme Court on
Feb. 25, 1974. BNA, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 652 (1974).
63. There is one other possible route by which the Supreme Court might avoid
a resolution of these issues. The Court could uphold the validity of the death-knell
doctrine, and thus confirm the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit in Eisen II (in which
the court was reviewing an order denying the maintenance of a class action), but rule
that Eisen III (wherein the court reviewed an order granting the maintenance of a class
action) was decided without jurisdiction. This result would be reached via the following analysis: A denial of a class action, while not an adjudication on the merits, is
an appealable order because, since the only feasible way of prosecuting the action is
on a class basis, to strike the class allegations will effectively end the action. Thus
the court in Eisen H had jurisdiction to review Judge Tyler's initial denial of the class
action. However, the allowance of a class action does not effectively put an end to
the litigation, and thus is not an appealable order. Therefore, Eisen III was decided
without jurisdiction, and a final determination of the propriety of the class action must
await an adjudication of the merits of the case and an appeal therefrom. Such a result
might appeal to the Court as a convenient means of letting important class action issues
"ripen" while allowing the clearly correct death-knell doctrine to stand.
To its great credit, the Supreme Court rejected this "possible rout" which would
have enabled it to avoid resolving certain of the issues presented in Eisen III in rendering
its decision on May 28, 1974. See the citation to the Supreme Court's opinion at note
14, supra, and detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in the Author's Note,
following footnote 206 at page 1405, infra. The Supreme Court took the view that the
District Court's allocation of 90 percent of the notice costs to the defendants constituted
a final determination of a claim of right separate from, and collateral to, rights asserted
in the action. Therefore the allocation decision was properly reviewable by federal

appellate courts under 28 U.S.C. 1291.

See 42 U.S.L.W. 4808-4809.
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theories that the courts and litigants will save time and money. 64 Such
theories are premised, however, on the idea that a large number of
small suits will be brought by the damaged members of the class unless
a class action procedure is allowed. The premise, in the usual mass

wrong situation is, at a minimum, very questionable. As is well known
to the defendant and, one suspects, to the court and to the attorney
for the plaintiff class, the individual members of the class will not,

in any appreciable numbers, bring individual lawsuits. 65 Furthermore,
as experience has taught all involved, class actions are elaborate and

time consuming cases.

Thus, in mass wrong situations, the amount

of court and lawyer time consumed will actually be greater if class
action treatment is allowed than will be consumed by the aggregate

of all the realistically predictable individual suits. 60
Another, and more realistic, justification for class actions which
has been advanced is that through the device of a class action more
wronged individual members of the class will receive compensation
than if the class members are forced to sue individually. 7 This theory
recognizes the fact that litigation is a time consuming and expensive

process from which mass wrong victims are foreclosed through economic considerations even if the assumption is made that the victims
are aware of the existence of the wrong, an assumption which is in68
accurate in the usual mass wrong situation.
64. E.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 714-15, 433 P.2d 732, 74547, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 737-39 (1967).
65. The vast majority of the members of the class will often never become aware
of the fact that they have been injured or the fact that they may bring an action for
individual redress. More importantly, the economic value of the redress obtainable is
usually far less than the value of the time and effort the consumer would have to expend in prosecuting an individual suit.
66. For reasons already discussed, if no class action is allowed, it is unlikely that
anyone will sue, and no court or lawyer time will be consumed. If a class action is
permitted, however, a great deal of court and lawyer time will be consumed, primarily
in the notice procedures of Rule 23 and in the discovery process. Thus in a mass
wrong situation, a class action will require greater court and lawyer time than will the
aggregate of the non existent (or negligible) number of alternative individual suits.
67. See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 715, 433 P.2d 732, 746, 63
Cal. Rptr. 724, 738 (1967).
68. The assumption is inaccurate because the wrongful conduct is frequently
highly complex. Mass fraud is often accomplished by means of subtle and technical
devices, such as the tampering with taxicab meters allged in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,
67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). Another dimensions of complexity may be added by the involvement of regulatory agencies, such as the Public
Utilities Commission, in Daar, the Securities and Exchange Commission, in Eisen, and
the Patent Office, in West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
Similar problems may be posed by the presence of self-regulatory bodies such as the
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There are, however, numerous situations in which the theory of
increasing the number of compensated victims is either not applicable
or its effect is minimal. This is the case in those mass wrong situations
in which the victims cannot be identified individually for purposes of
disbursing compensation to them. When the possible class contains
large numbers of unidentifiable members, the most realistic and persuasive argument for mass wrong class actions which can be advanced
is the "therapeutic benefits" theory of class actions.
The following excerpt is a succinct statement of the simple idea
behind the theory: 69
The value of class actions, albeit reward-inspired, has been
repeatedly established in recent decades by shareholders' suits.
They are therapeutic, helping to maintain the health of our corporate system. In hundreds of suits which would not have been
instituted without -the allure of generous compensations, a miscarriage of justice has been prevented. At the same time the record
New York Stock Exchange, again exemplified by Eisen. Finally, in the majority of
mass wrong situations which have given rise to reported decisions, the wrong results
from violations of the federal antitrust laws. Antitrust cases are notorious for the complexity and proof problems which they invariably entail. Here again, Eisen and Pfizer,
both of which involve allegations of price-fixing, are illustrative.
Even assuming knowledge of the wrong, economic considerations will effectively
foreclose individual suits due to the insignificant money damages suffered by individual
victims. Judge Medina estimates at one point that the average individual injury in
Eisen was $3.90. Eisen is typical in this respect. No mass wrong class action is
known to the author in which the injuries suffered by individual class members would
not have been far outstripped by the counsel fees necessary to prove the claim.
Thus it is clear that ignorance of the injury is not the prime obstacle to vindication of individual injuries suffered in mass wrong situations. Nor will awareness of
the injury overcome the true obstacle: that "no lawyer of competence" is going to undertake complex litigation on a contingency basis when the claimed damages are insubstantial; and no victim of a $50 injury will be willing, even in the unlikely event that
he is able, to pay a sufficient retainer to justify counsel's undertaking such litigation.
69. Cases discussing the therapeutic benefits of class actions include Esplin v.
Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968): Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D.
25, 33, 39 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 125, 132 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 485-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
Commentaries include Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in
Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HAv.L. REV. 658, 662-63 (1956); Kalven & Rosenfield, The
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CI. L. REV. 684, 686-87, 717 (1941);
Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions Under Federal Rule
23(b)(3), 54 F.R.D. 501, 508 (1972); Moore, The Potential Function of the Modern
Class Suit, 2 CLASS AcTIoN REP. 47, 51, 54-55, 58-59 (1973); Note, Consumer Protection-Public Class Actions-New Hope for Defrauded Consumers, 76 DICK. L. REV.
342, 351 (1972); Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARv. L. REV. 426, 455 (1973); Note, Expanding the Impact of State Court

Class Action Adjudications to Provide an Effective Forum for Consumers, 18 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1002, 1021 (1971),
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of litigated cases is prophylactic-a deterrent to -the future wrongdoer. Every successful suit duly rewarded encourages other suits
to redress misconduct and by the same token discourages misconduct which would occasion suit. There can be no doubt that these
derivative suits have materially raised the
70 standards of fiduciary
relationships and other economic behavior.
The same idea has been expressed by courts many times to justify a willingness to enlarge the prize, or judgment, obtainable through
private rights of action which have strong collateral public benefits,
thus providing an increased incentive for the pursuit of these private
remedies. The view is that such private remedies should be encouraged, and thus that they should be made attractive, and obstacles to
V
their use minimized.
The Supreme Court has recognized "therapeutics" as a legitimate
factor in considering the judicial expansion of private remedies for violations of a statute. In J. L Case Co. v. Borak,71 the Court found
an implied private right of action in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 despite the absence of any such provision in the Act itself, stating:
Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary
supplement to Commission action. As in anti-trust treble damage
litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves
as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy requirements. The Commission advises that it examines over 2,000
proxy statements annually and each of them must necessarily be
expedited. Time does not permit an independent examination of
the facts set out in the proxy material and this results in the Commission's acceptance of the representations contained therein at
their face value unless contrary to other material on file with it
We, therefore, believe that under the circumstances here it
as
is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies
72
are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.
Another example of the use of therapeutics as a rationale for enhancing the attractiveness of certain private actions is the "private attorney general" concept as a basis for awarding attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs in certain actions affected with a public interest. An
73
extensive analysis of this concept appears in La Raza Unida v. Volpe,
where it is described as follows:
[W]henever there is nothing in the statutory scheme [under which
70.
69 HAuv.
71.
72.
73.

Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factorin Counsel Fee Awards,
L. REV. 658, 662-63 (1956).
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
Id. at 432.
57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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the action is brought] which might be interpreted as precluding
it, a "private attorney-general" should be awarded attorneys' fees
when he has effectuated a strong Congressional policy which has
benefited a large class of people, and where further the necessity
and financial burden
of private enforcement are such as to make
74
the award essential.
The case involved a victorious suit to enjoin -the construction of a
highway with federal funds when federal requirements regarding studies
of environmental impact and relocation of displaced residents had not
been complied with. Due, among other things, to the effectuation
of Congressional policies which the suit furthered, the court awarded
attorneys' fees to plaintiffs on the theory that -they had acted as private
attorneys general.
While the discussions of therapeutics in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak
and La Raza Unida v. Volpe do not concern the maintenance of a
class action, these discussions do illustrate an increasingly prevalent
judicial tendency to resolve important legal questions with a strong
concern for the effect of the resolution of the question upon the incentives for future private actions which have a therapeutic benefit. The
strongest judicial emphasis on therapeutics as a basis for a liberal construction of Rule 23 is seen in Dolgow v. Anderson,7" a decision which
received harsh treatment from Judge Medina in Eisen 111. 7 , Dolgow
was commenced as a class action alleging certain violations of the securities laws. At an early stage of the litigation, District Judge Weinstein
responded to defendant's motion to dismiss the class action by stressing
that: "The Rule 23 class action as a way of redressing group wrongs is
a semi-public remedy administered by the lawyer in private practice-a
77
cross between administrative action and private litigation.1
Citing a wide variety of authority, Judge Weinstein noted that
shareholder class suits are "a primary means of enforcing desired
standards of conduct on the part of corporate officials, ' 8 that without
class actions there would be little practical check on betrayal of shareholder interests by directors, 79 and that the provisions of the Securities
74.

Id. at 98.

75.

43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).

76. "Of the few District Court decisions on the point [of a preliminary hearing
on the merits] most of these disagree . . . with the innovations described in Dolgow,
and there is little to commend the reasoning or lack of reasoning in the others." 479
F.2d at 1016.
77. 43 F.R.D. at 481, citing Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function
of the Class Suit, 8 U. CH. L. REv. 684, 717 (1941).

78.
79.

43 F.R.D. at 486.
Id.
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Act for civil liability are calculated to be largely preventive rather than
redressive.8 0
In a number of other decisions, the same attitude and decisive
effect of therapeutic benefit considerations is seen. In Esplin v.
Hirschi,81 in which a class action under the Securities Exchange Act
was permitted, the court stated:
[T]aking the issue in the context of the securities laws and realizing that "the ultimate effectiveness of federal remedies . . . may
depend in large measure on the applicability of the class action
device," the interests of justice require that in a doubtful case...
any error if there is to 8be
one, should be committed in favor of
2
allowing the class action.
Similar sentiments appear in the California Supreme Court opinion
in Daarv. Yellow Cab Co.: 3
[A]bsent a class suit, recovery by any of the individual taxicab
users is unlikely. The complaint alleges that there is a relatively
small loss to each individual class member. In such a case separate actions would be economically unfeasible. . . . It is more
likely that, absent a class suit, defendant will retain the benefits
from its alleged wrongs. A procedure that would permit the allegedly injured parties to recover the amount of8 4their overpayments
is to be preferred over the foregoing alternative.
The therapeutic benefits theory of class actions is a traditional /
type of lawyer conceived rationale, simple in its statement yet quite
compelling. It appeals to the taxpayer in all of us because of the
saving of public monies which would otherwise have to be spent for
effective enforcement of the statutes involved, assuming that effective
enforcement is a desired goal. 8 Finally, and most importantly, the
sheer unanswerable morality of the notion that the wrongdoer should
not be allowed to keep the spoil from his activity is forceful, to say
the least.
80. Id. at 487, citing Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE
LJ. 227 (1934).

81.

402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968).

82. Id. at 101 (citations omitted).
83. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
84. Id. at 715, 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
85. This assumption is not as self-evident as might be supposed. A number of
state and federal criminal statutes are unenforced due to the exericse of prosecutorial
discretion. In the case of obsolete or trivial statutes, an official decision not to prosecute is usually correct. Thus effective enforcement of criminal statutes is not invariably a desirable goal. This point carries with it the correlative idea that private enforcement of criminal statutes, through class actions or otherwise, should be subjected
to some form of reasonable control, or, alternatively, the statute books should be
pruned of undesirable criminal proscriptions. See R. POSNER, ECONOmIC ANALYsIs OF
LAw 373-79 (1973).
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However comfortable the therapeutic benefits theory is to some
judges and lawyers, it was unpersuasive in the extreme to Judge
Medina. We can speculate that the Judge was perhaps reacting
against what he viewed as excessively moralizing advocacy as he gave
the theory short shrift in his opinion. But it is better to read the
Judge's own words in this regard:
[S]tatements about "disgorging" sums of money for which a
defendant may be liable, or the "prophylactic" effect of making
the wrongdoer suffer the pains of retribution and generally about
providing a remedy for the ills of mankind, do little to solve speific legal problems. The result of this approach is almost always
confusion of thought and irrational, emotional and unsound decisions. . . [N]one of these considerations justifies disregarding,
nullifying or watering down any of the procedural safeguards
established by the Constitution, or by Congressional mandate, or
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including amended Rule
23. It is a historical fact that procedural safeguards for the benefit of all litigants constitute some of the most important and salutary protections against oppressions, including
oppressions by those
86
whose intentions may be above reproach.
It will be argued hereafter that neither statutory nor constitutional
requirements are as clear as Judge Medina appears to believe.8 7
Judge Oakes, in his dissent from the denial of the petition for an en
banc hearing,88 calls the majority result "doubtful to say the least," 9
and expresses concern over the implications of the decision for class
actions in general and their therapeutic benefits in particular. He
states:
The panel opinion seems on its face to give a green light to
monopolies and conglomerates who deal in quantity items selling
at small prices to proceed to violate the antitrust laws, unham86.

479 F.2d at 1013.

87.

Indeed, it is beyond controversy that courts and commentators are sharply di-

vided on the nature of these requirements. Compare the liberal appraoch of Esplin
v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968); Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D.

25 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 54 F.R.D. 465 (W.D. Pa.
1972); Nolop v. Volpe, 33 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971); Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D.
121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619 (D.
Kan. 1968); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); and Snyder v.
Board of Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill. 1968); with the strict approach of Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969), and the cases cited in Eisen I1, 479 F.2d at 1017
n.20.
Polar opposites in the commentaries are represented by Pomerantz, The "Notice
to the Class" Under Amended Rule 23, 1968 PAc-ncING LAW INsTITuTE 33 (liberal),
and Maraist & Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled Marriage: Due Process and the
Class Action, 49 TExAs L. REv. 1 (1970) (restrictive).
88. 479 F.2d at 1021.
89. Id. at 1022.
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pered by any realistic threat of private consumer civil proceedings,
leaving it to some vague future act of Congress to protect the innocent consumer. The panel opinion as I read it tells polluters
that they are pretty safe from class actions because even if a whole
city is blanketed in smoke or its water supply contaminated, the
plaintiffs can never advance the money for notices to, say, all the
people in the city phone book, who certainly are identifiable.9 0
The color of the language used by both Judge Medina and Judge
Oakes is indeed intense, and shows that reasonable men, even eminent
and learned reasonable men, can differ over the issues raised in Eisen
IlL. However, it is also abundantly clear that Judge Medina did not
give the same type of consideration to the therapeutic benefits effect
of the question before him as did the courts in numerous recent federal and state decisions.
(b) The Economics Involved
While an economist would be unmoved by the moralizing which
often accompanies judicial statements of the therapeutic benefits
theory of class actions, he would grant the validity of the basis of the
theory. Indeed, the therapeutic benefits theory, used as a judicial
rationale for permitting class suits which require a defendant to pay
damages to the plaintiff class in an amount equal to the individual
damages suffered by the class members, 9 is implicitly based upon
well-known economic concepts such as "external cost" (of a firm's
business operations) and "internalization" (of those "external costs").
The economist credited with first stating the concept of external cost
is the late Professor A. C. Pigou of Cambridge University. Pigou laid
the foundation for a discussion of the external cost principle by the
following observation:
[O]ne person A, in the course of rendering some service, for
which payment is made, to a second person B, incidentally also
renders services or disservices to other persons (not producers of
like services), of such a sort that payment cannot be exacted from
the benefited parties
or compensation enforced on behalf of the
92
injured parties.

90.
91.

Id.
See text accompanying note 84supra and notes 191-196 infra.
92. A. PIGot, TnE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 183 (4th ed. 1932) (emphasis
added). In the quotation and generally, Pigou discusses the ideas of both external benefits as well as external costs. For our purposes we shall examine only the latter concept since we are concerned with the mass wrong consumer abuse situation. Pigou also
specifically refers to the "disservices" rendered to "other persons" implying persons
other than B, to whom services are being rendered. We are, of course, concerned with
"disservices" or external costs which are inflicted upon consumers who have a direct
commercial relationship with the renderer of services (which is A in Pigou's example).
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To illustrate, Pigou mentioned the instance of sparks from a cargohauling railroad engine setting fire to woods adjoining the track.9 3
Since at that time in Britain a railroad had no liability to adjacent landowners who suffered damage caused by sparks from an engine, Pigou
viewed the loss which they suffered as an external cost, since members
of society other than the producers of the goods or services9 4 would
have to bear the cost of the damage to the trees, a cost generated
and made necessary by the act of production. With the previously
mentioned rules of liability of the jurisdiction at the time, the railroad
did not have to "internalize" or take into account the cost of the spark
damage to the woods in determining its most profitable level and
method of doing business.
From the foregoing it would appear that once an "external cost"
has been identified, the party who "caused" or generated the external
cost should be forced to internalize it, and this was the implication
generally attributed to Pigou by economists.9" However, this implication leads to an economically unsound conclusion in those situations
in which placing the liability on the party who caused the damage,
thereby compelling internalization of the cost, would result in a lower
total output of goods and services by the entire society than would
be the case if the "external cost" is allowed to remain the burden of
persons other than the producer.9 6 Thus, the question of who should
be assigned the legal liability for a particular cost of production can
be both important and disputed. However, in the situation with which
we are here concerned, a mass wrong consumer abuse accomplished,
for example, by fraudulent advertising, the legal liability, at least in
theory, is already established beyond debate. Thus, our concern is
not who should bear the liability, but what is the economic effect of
a new procedural device which would, as a practical matter, force the
internalization of the otherwise external cost of the fraudulent adverThis is not a significant distinction however because the basic fact in either case is
that the persons who must bear the producer's external cost(s) cannot force the pro-

ducer to reimburse them because they either do not have the legal right to reimbursement or there is no practical way for them to enforce such a right.
93. See A. PIGou, WEALTH AND WELFARE 129-30 n.35 (1912).
94. Pigou used the phrase "social cost" to refer to the total cost incurred by all
members of the society (including the producer) by the specific act of production.
Thus, Pigou included within "social cost" the "external cost" suffered by parties other
than the producer as well as the "internal cost" incurred by the producer. Pigou used
the phrase "private cost" synonomously with "internal cost." Economists have used a
variety of terms for these concepts. For example, external costs are referred to on occasion as "external diseconomies." P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 453-54 (8th ed. 1970).
95. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1960).
96. See id. at 31-34.
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tisement. The external cost of a fraudulnt advertisement will consist, at least in part, of the defeated legitimate expectations of the consumers who rely upon the advertisement in making their purchases.
In a minority of American jurisdictions, this cost in terms of the damages available to a plaintiff is measured by the difference between the
price paid for the product by the purchasing consumers and the value
of the product. In a majority of jurisdictions in this country, the cost
is measured by the difference between the value of the product as
For our
falsely represented and thd actual value of the product."
purposes it is not important whether a jurisdiction follows the minority
or majority rule of damages, nor is it important whether the damages
recoverable for fraud equal the full extent of the external costs of
a false advertisement. We are assuming a mass wrong situation in
which the individual damages suffered by any measurement are too
small to justify suit, but the aggregate damages suffered by the group
are very large. Our sole concern is the economic effect of the adoption
of a class action procedure which, as a practical matter, will enable the
group to recover the aggregate damages from the false advertiser.
We can be sure that if a producer-advertiser knows that he will
incur a massive judgment liability for the perpetration of a fraudulent
advertisement, this prospect will be a relevant and significant consideration for him in determining whether or not to run such a fraudulent
advertisement. The effect of the adoption in the relevant jurisdiction
of an effective class action procedure applicable to mass wrong situations upon such considerations by a producer-advertiser is shown
graphically in Figures I through 4 below.
In Figure 1 the horizontal axis represents the possible outputs
which the producer-advertiser can produce, with the point at which
the output axis intersects the vertical axis representing zero. Thus,
the number of units of output on the output axis increases moving
from left to right. The vertical axis represents the unit price which
the producer-advertiser can charge for his product, with that price
equalling zero at the point at which the price axis intersects the output
axis. The possible unit prices which can be charged increases in an
upward direction on the price axis. The line marked "D" is the demand "curve" and represents, at any given level of output, the unit
price at which the public will buy all of the output produced by the
producer-advertiser.9 8 Thus, at points on the upper left of the de97. W. PRossmi, LAw op TORmS 733-36 (4th ed. 1971).
98. Of course the relatiomhip betwen output and price which is represented by
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Fig. 1. Business Operations Before False Advertising.
mand curve the public will pay a high price for the producer's product
because output is small, while at the lower right of the demand curve
the public will only pay a low price for the product because the output is large. The line labelled "MR" is the marginal revenue curve
which represents the total increase in revenue realized by the producer-advertiser by producing additional units. The line marked "ATC"
is the average total cost curve, representing the total cost per unit incurred by the producer-advertiser in producing any given quantity of
units. The line marked "MC" is the marginal cost curve which represents the change in the total cost incurred by the producer-advertiser with
each additional unit which he chooses to produce.
The point at which the marginal cost and marginal revenue
curves intersect establishes the quantity of production at which the
rational producer-advertiser should cease producing units of his prodthe demand curve can also be stated as showing, at any given unit price, the level of
output of the product which will be demanded and purchased by the public.
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uct. At any level of production after this point (to the right of the
intersection of the curve) the marginal cost of an additional unit of
production exceeds the marginal revenue to be obtained by producing and selling that unit and the producer-advertiser can only lose
money by such action. The price at which the public will purchase
all of the quantity produced at the optimum level of rational production can be established by drawing a straight line perpendicular to the
output axis which passes through the intersection of the marginal cost
and average total cost curves and continues upward to intersect with
the demand curve. By connecting the point of this latter intersection
with the price axis by a line which is perpendicular to the price axis
(and horizontal to the output axis) the producer-advertiser can establish the unit price to charge for the optimum level of output. Having
thus established the optimum output level, and the price at which each
unit produced at that optimum level should be sold, the producer-advertiser can, by multiplying the two, determine the total revenue which
he will obtain by producing at the optimum level of production. To
establish the amount of profit which he will make at the optimum output, the producer need only connect the line which has been previously drawn perpendicular to the output axis and running through the
intersection of the marginal revenue and marginal cost curve so that
it intersects with the average total cost curve. By drawing a line perpendicular to the price axis (and horizontal to the output axis) connecting the point of the latter intersection to the price axis, the producer can know the price or cost he is paying for producing each unit
at the optimum level of output. Multiplying this unit price or cost
figure by the optimum output will yield the total cost of this production. Subtracting this total cost of the optimum level of output from
the total revenues realizable by producing at the optimum level will
yield the profit which the producer-advertiser can realize at the optimum level of production. In Figure 1 this profit is shown spatially
as a shaded rectangle. For purposes of visualizing the effect upon
profits by the internalization of the otherwise external cost of a fraudulent advertisement it is essential only that the reader be able to compare the size of the shaded profit areas in this Figure and Figures
3 and 4 below.
In Figure 2 we see what will happen to the demand and marginal
revenue curves facing a producer-advertiser if he resorts to a successful fraudulent advertisement to stimulate demand for this product. 99
99. The same effect may occur, of course, as the result of a successful non-fraud-
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Fig. 2.

Prospective Shift in Demand with False Advertising

The fraudulent advertisement stimulates the demand of the public
for the producer-advertiser's product, and the public is now willing to
pay a higher unit price for the product at any level of production
chosen by the producer-advertiser. Thus, the demand curve shifts
from the "old" position (shown by the dotted line marked "D") to
the new position shown by the unbroken line labelled "D2 ." This upward or rightward shift of the demand curve causes a similar upward
or rightward shift in the marginal revenue curve. This is seen by comparing the position of the old marginal revenue curve, shown by a
broken line labelled "MIR" and the new marginal revenue curve shown
by an unbroken line labelled "MR 1 ."
ulent advertisement also, but we are positing a situation in which the producer-advertiser is only contemplating the use of a fraudulent ad. To keep the point clearly in
mind we shall assume that only a fraudulent ad will be effective or successful in stimulating demand for the producer-advertiser's product.
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Fig. 3.

Prospective Business Operations with False AdvertisingNo Class Action Possible

In Figure 3 we see the effects of added expense, incurred in running the fraudulent advertisement, on the average total cost and the
marginal cost curves. The figure also enables us to observe the expected profit picture which can be forecast by the producer-advertiser
if there is no effective class action procedure available for forcing the
producer-advertiser to internalize the external cost of the fraudulent
advertisement. Since there is an expense involved in producing and
running the fraudulent advertisement, we would expect the average
total cost (which includes all the cost elements of producing and selling the product) to be increased at all levels of output. This is shown
in Figure 3 by the upward shift from the old average total cost curve
(shown as a broken line labelled "ATC") to the new average total
cost curve which is shown by an unbroken line labelled "ATC'." With
this upward shift to the new average total cost curve we see that the
marginal cost curve is also shifted upward. This is shown in Figure
3 by comparing the old marginal cost curve (shown by a broken line
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labelled "MC") with the position of the new marginal cost curve which
is shown by an unbroken line labelled "MCI." The optimum level
of production, the price at which that level of output can be sold to
the public, the total revenues realizable at that level of output and
the total cost incurred at that level of output are established in the
same manner as was used in connection with Figure 1. We see now
that the shaded profit area, representing the total profit which the producer-advertiser can expect to realize as a result of a successful fraudulent advertisement when he is not forced to internalize the external
costs of the fraudulent advertisement is considerably larger than the
shaded profit are in Figure 1.100
Clearly a rational, but immoral, producer-advertiser on the basis
of a comparison of the profit areas in Figures 3 and 1 would resort
to the use of a false advertisement since his total profit would increase
as the result. The changes in the profit area caused by the prospect
of an effective class action procedure are shown in Figure 4.
In Figure 4 we see that the demand and marginal revenue curves
("D' and "MR"') are unchanged from Figure 3 since the produceradvertiser could still expect the same shift in demand curve regardless of the fact that he now faces the prospect of an effective class
action procedure being used by defrauded consumers. However, the
average total cost and marginal cost curves are drastically shifted upward by the prospect of an effective class action. In Figure 4 the
average total cost curve established in Figure 3 (shown by broken line
labelled "ATC"') is replaced by the new average total cost curve shown
as the unbroken line labelled "ATC2 ." This upward shift logically
results from the added prospect of effective class action procedure
which permits the aggregation and recovery of all the defrauded consumer claims against him. Not only must the producer-advertiser reckon with the prospect of having to face a potential damage liability of
large proportions but he must also include a calculation of the attendant legal expense he will incur in attempting to meet the class action
as well as the detrimental effects of the adverse publicity which he
will receive as the result of the filing and prosecution of the class action. With the dramatic upward shift of the average total cost curve we
see a similarly dramatic shift upward of the marginal cost curve,
100.

We have assumed that a relatively inexpensive fraudulent ad will produce a

sharp shift in the demand curve in arriving at the attractive profit forecast. Such an
assumption is reasonable in view of the fact that, freed of the restraints of truth, an
advertiser should be able to construct the most effective and compelling advertisement
possible.
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Prospective Business Operations with False Advertising'Class Action Allowable

shown by the unbroken line labelled "MG2"' which replaces the marginal cost curve established in Figure 3 (shown in this figure by the
broken line~ labelled "MCI"). After establishing the optimum level
of output, the price at which this level of output can be sold to the
public and the total cost of producing the optimum level of output in
the same manner used in reference to Figures 1 and 3, .the advertiserproducer can derive the total profit which he can expect to realize
by the false advertisement when it is run in a jurisdiction in which
consumers can resort to an effective class action procedure. This total
profit, which is again shown by the shaded rectangle, is no larger, and,
depending upon specific facts, may be smaller than the profit which
the producer-advertiser could realize without resort to running the
false advertisement. (Compare the shaded areas in Figuresi 1 and
4.l x All that the advertiser-producer could accomplish by resorting
101. The profit areas in Figures 1 and 4 are the same size or very close to the
same size. However, it is not invariably the case that the increase in prospective costs
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to the false advertisement is to raise the level of prices at which the
public will purchase his output (the shifting of the demand curve upward or rightward) together with an increase in the average total cost,
including the calculation of the potential expense of a class action and
the attendant legal fees and adverse publicity, which he will incur at
any given level of output. Thus the only changes he will produce
in his business operation by resorting to the false advertisement is to
engage in transactions (selling his units and purchasing the inputs of
production) involving larger sums of money without changing his profit prospect. A rational producer would therefore forego running the
false advertisement because he must internalize the otherwise external
cost of the false advertisement. In short, he will be deterred from
resorting to false advertising.
2. The Evolving Constitutional Right to Meaningfully
Participate in the Litigation Process
In a number of cases in the last twenty years, and in pursuance
of different constitutional theories, the United States Supreme Court
has established what the author perceives as a right of meaningful
access to the litigation forum secured to all U.S. citizens as part of
their constitutional birthright. While the exact contours and content
of this evolving right are not yet precisely established, it is clear that
one significant hallmark of the right is that is must be available to
a citizen as a practical, and not merely theoretical, matter. Another
established facet of the right is that if association for the purpose of
enforcement of individual rights through litigation is a practical necessity then such association is also protected as part of the basic right.
We begin our exploration of this right to participate in the litigation process by noting the obvious impracticality of the individual lawsuits which Judge Medina's decision would require the members of
the purported class to undertake. The injury alleged in Eisen is a
classic example of a mass wrong with a substantial aggregate injury,
but minimal individual damage claims:
During the period May, 1962 through June, 1966, the "average shareholder" who had odd-lot transactions in stocks listed on
the NYSE had approximately 5 such transactions . . . . The
average odd-lot differential per transaction during such period was
approximately $5.18.102
from running a false ad will exactly cancel out the increased future revenues.

The

graphs are intended to illustrate, not quantify, the basic idea that the forced internali-

zation of the fraud damage cost of consumers will alter the economic attractiveness of
a fraudulent advertisement to a producer-advertiser.
102. 52 F.R.D. at 257.
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Thus, the average odd-lot differential paid by each class member was
$25.90. Assuming, as did Judge Tyler, that 5 percent of the oddlot differential resulted from defendants' alleged antitrust activities, 03
the damage suffered by the average class member would have been
approximately $1.30. Even allowing for trebling of damage claims
provided under the antitrust laws, individual claims would still have
averaged only $3.90.14

The futility of individual suits to recover

such miniscule sums is clear without comment.
Problems such as this served as part of the impetus for the creation of the equitable class action procedure. 10 5 The impetus proceeded from a recognition that, without it, legal relief to a small
claimant with a complex cause of action would be an impossibility.
Thus, it has been observed that "the historic mission of the class action is to help the smaller guy."' ° Similar concerns produced the independent growth of two related constitutional concepts which have
unrealized potential in consideration of class action questions: (1)
the right of meaningful access to the courts, 10 7 and (2) the right to
associate for purposes of litigation. 0 8 The common concern of these
concepts is apparent, but their origins are entirely distinct and thus
call for separate treatment.
(a) The Basic Right to Litigate
In Boddie v. Connecticut,0 9 decided in 1971, the Supreme

Court held that the due process clause prohibited a state from denying an indigent couple seeking a divorce access to its courts by requiring the payment of court fees. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, analogized the position of petitioners in Boddie to that normally
occupied by a defendant. He reasoned that since the only means
for obtaining a divorce was by recourse to the courts, the couple seeking a divorce is, like every defendant, reduced to a position in which
"the judicial proceeding becomes the only effective means of resolving
103. Judge Tyler assumed the 5 percent figure for "purposes of establishing a minimum on potential damages," noting that Eisen's $70 claim was prediated upon an alleged illegal overcharge of 27 percent. Id. at 265 n.8.
104. These computations also appear in Eisen I1, 479 F.2d at 1010.
105.

See Z. CmAXFEE, Soivm PROBLEMS OF EQurrY (1950).

106. Statement of Professor Ben Kaplan, Reporter of the New Rules, quoted in
Frankel, Amended Rule 23 from a Judge's Point of View, 32 ANTrmrns L.r. 295, 299
(1966).

107.

See text accompanying notes 109-26 infra.

108.
109.

See text accompanying notes 127-37 infra.
401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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the dispute . . . ."10 It was, as viewed by the Court, as though a
defendant who had been sued was refused permission to defend:
Resort to the judicial process by these plaintiffs [meaning
divorcing marriage partners] is no more voluntary in a realistic sense
than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests in
court. For both groups this process is not only the paramount dispute-settlement technique, but, in fact, the only available one. In
this posture we think that this appeal is properly to be resolved
in light of the principles enunciated in our due process decisions
that delimit rights of defendants compelled to litigate their differences in the judicial forum.1 1
Having adopted this perspective, the Court proceeded to evaluate
the denial of relief in terms of its impact on two important principles,
the constitutional requirement of a meaningful opportunity to be
heard, and the special status of the marriage relationship in our
society.
As to the former, Justice Harlan observed that
due process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing
state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle
their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 112
The court recognized in addition that imposition of court fees and costs
on litigants was, in itself, unquestionably valid as a legitimate exercise
of state power.11 3 However, in this case the exercise of the power
was declared invalid under the due process clause. Its exercise operated, as a practical matter, to curtail constitutional freedoms, and
thus to that extent was invalid.
The concern of the Court over the effect of the denial on "the
marriage relationship" is evidenced in a number of passages from the
opinion:
As this Court on more than one occasion has recognized,
marriage involves interests of basic importance in our society. It is
not surprising, then, that the States have seen fit to oversee many
aspects of that institution. Without a prior judicial imprimatur, individuals may freely enter into and rescind commercial contracts,
for example, but we are unaware of any jurisdiction where private
citizens 14
may covenant for or dissolve marriage without state approval."
110. Id. at 376.
111. Id.at376-77.
112. Id. at 377.
113. See id. at 379-80. "Our cases further establish that a statute or a rule may
be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an individual of
a protected right although its general validity as a measure enacted in the legitimate
exercise of state power is beyond question." Id. at 380.
114. Id. at 376 (citations omitted).
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To further make the point that the type of proceeding involved was
important to the outcome of the case the majority opinion continued:
We do not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a
right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by -the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that its exercise may not
be placed beyond the reach of any individual, for, as we have as already noted, in the case before us this right is the exclusive precondition
to the adjustment of a fundamental human relation1 15
ship.

The extent to which the Boddie decision hinges upon the special
nature of the marriage relationship was and is a point of disagreement
among the Supreme Court justices" 6 and commentators. 117 Some believe that, regardless of the right asserted, access to the courts is always
guaranteed by the due process clause."" The late Justice Black, although initially hesitant, is representative of this view:
I dissented in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 389
(1971), but now believe that if the decision in that case is to continue to be the law, it cannot and should not be restricted to persons seeking a divorce. It is bound to be expanded to all civil
cases. Persons seeking a divorce are no different from other
members of society who must resort to judicial process for resolution of their disputes. Consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution, special favors cannot and should not
be accorded to divorce litigants. 19
In my view, the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can safely
rest on only one crucial foundation-that the civil courts of the
United States and each of the States belong to the people of this
conntry and that no person can be denied access to those courts
. . . because he cannot pay 20
a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty,
or afford to hire an attorney.
The view of Justice Black that the Boddie rationale applies with
equal vigor to all types of legal proceedings was rejected by a majority
115. Id. at 382-83.
116. Compare United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973) (Burger, CJ.,
concurring), with id. at 451 (Stewart, J., dissenting), and id. at 458 (Marshall, I., dissenting).
117. Scholarly comment generally gives Boddie an expansive reading. See, e.g.,
LaFrance, ConstitutionalLaw Reform for the Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971 DuKE
L.J. 487; Note, United States v. Kras, Justice at a Price, 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 147
(1973); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HAv. L. Rav. 3, 104 (1971); Note
Indigent Access to Civil Courts: The Tiger is at the Gates, 26 VAN. L. REV. 25
(1973).
118. See, e.g., LaFrance, Constitutional Law Reform for the Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971 Dutm IJ. 487.
119. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 954 n.1 (1971), denying
cert. to 225 Ga. 91, 166 S.E.2d 88 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 955-56.
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of the Supreme Court in United States v. Kras.'2 ' The basic determination made in that opinion is that the Boddie rationale does not
apply in the case of a person who desires adjudication as a bankrupt.
More specifically the decision holds that there is no constitutionally
protected right of access to the bankruptcy court. Therefore, an indigent who cannot pay the filing fees for a petition in bankruptcy can
make no claim that his constitutional rights have been infringed.
However, for two reasons, it does not follow that due to the Kras decision the only permissible reading of Boddie is that the right of access
to the courts will be protected only when the substantive right asserted
enjoys a special status similar to divorce actions.
First, a comparison of the language of Boddie with the facts of
Kras suggests that, of the two decisions, Kras is more likely to be
limited to its facts. In the passage from Boddie quoted above, the
majority speaks of the right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard
as to "claims of right and duty,"'122 or, in other words, to participate
in litigation with another. Kras, however, involved a bankruptcy proceeding, not litigation with an adverse party. There is an obvious
distinction between the usual legal action by which a party seeks to
enforce a claim to redress a wrong inflicted upon him by another, and
a procedure in which a petitioner seeks to obtain an order allowing
him to escape valid legal claims. In this sense, bankruptcy is fundamentally unlike other kinds of legal proceedings. Under this interpretation, the most expansive readings of Boddie may be left almost
123
totally undisturbed by the Kras case.
Second, the basis upon which the Boddie decision distinguishes
an apparently hostile prior holding strongly suggests that Boddie was
not grounded upon the special status of divorce. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 24 the Supreme Court had upheld a state
requirement that a shareholder prosecuting a derivative action put up
121. 409 U.S.434 (1973).
122. 401 U.S. at 377.
123. While it is the author's contention that, as indicated, Kras can be distinguished from Boddie it is clear that a number of general statements in the cases conflict. One can expect that lower courts will have to concern themselves with the extent of these conflicts in cases in which one of the parties will argue that a constitutionally protected right to litigate a particular type of cause of action or claim falls
under the Boddie rationale. The extent to which Boddie may be curtailed by Kras will
be ascertained only over time, as a succession of such cases, involving different substantive claims, find their way to the Supreme Court. The contention made here is that
the logical result of this process should be the limitation of Kras to its facts, with minimal disturbance to the principles stated in Boddie.
124. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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security for defendant's expenses and, if unsuccessful, pay those expenses. The Court, noting that a corporation is an artificial entity,
existing only at the indulgence of the state, held that the "Constitution
does not oblige the state to place its litigating and adjudicating processes at the disposal of such a representative .... "15 In Boddie,
defendant, relying upon the Cohen decision, argued that a reasonable
fee requirement imposed on litigants in any action was constitutionally
permissible. The Supreme Court could easily have distinguished
Cohen on the ground that divorce actions are special as they relate
to a basic human relationship in our society and are to be viewed differently from all other legal actions. Had it done so, it would be
clear that the crucial point in Boddie was not the importance of access
to the courts, but the importance of marriage and the procedure for
its dissolution. The Court, however, specifically rested its distinction
of Cohen on other grounds:
We -think [Cohen] has no bearing on this case. Differences
between divorce actions and derivative actions aside, unlike
Cohen, where we considered merely a statute on its face, the application of26this statute here operates to cut off entirely access to
the courts.'
This statement indicates a fear that to distinguish Cohen purely on
the grounds that divorce actions and derivative actions are different
would suggest that access to the courts is important only in divorce
cases. The wording of the statement appears carefully calculated to
avoid this suggestion, and -thus by implication to suggest that the linchpin of the decision was the denial of access to the courts, and not the
special status of domestic relations.
Thus to the Boddie court the key distinction between Cohen and
the case before it appears to be that in Cohen there was a moneyed
plaintiff who was able, but refused, to post bond, while Boddie involved an indigent plaintiff who was unable to pay the costs. The
bond requirement in Cohen made access to the courts more costly,
but did not preclude it entirely, whereas in Boddie the fee requirement, as a practical matters, foreclosed access to litigation. Thus the
Court's approach to the Cohen decision indicates that where litigation
involving claims of rights and duties of natural persons is involved,
the extent of practical foreclosure of the plaintiff from the litigation
process is the crucial fact which determines the application of the due
process clause, and the specific type of legal action brought is irrelevant.
125. Id. at 549-50.
126. 401 U.S. at 381 n.9.
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While the effect of Kras upon Boddie and the full implications
of Boddie's treatment of Cohen may be subjects of controversy, one
thing remains clear. That is -that the Boddie decision recognizes
and stresses the extreme importance of practical access to the courts
for those whose claims of right and duty cannot otherwise be resolved. Whether access to the courts is a constitutionally protected
right may depend upon the nature of the right asserted, but in every
case, at a minimum, a strong policy exists in favor of affording practical access to the litigation forum.
(b) The Right to Associate to Litigate
Markedly similar concerns have given rise to a parallel development in the area of First Amendment rights. During the early period
of the civil rights movement it was apparent that few individual victims of racial discrimination were capable of financing litigation to secure judicial relief. This fact prompted the formation of, and reliance upon, organizations for the purpose of pooling resources and
communicating information concerning the extent of minority group
rights and the availability of legal redress. Claiming the purpose of
maintaining high ethical standards in the legal profession, various state
legislatures passed statutes ostensibly aimed at tighter control of the
solicitation of legal claims and the unauthorized practice of law by laymen. Law enforcement agencies were quick to enforce the new
legislation against various civil rights groups.
In these prosecutions, the defendant civil rights groups argued
that the statutes were unconstitutional, and the issue was presented
to the United States Supreme Court in 1963 in the case of NAACP
v. Button.'2 7 The Virginia state statute involved in the case prohibited
lawyers from soliciting legal claims. The defendants, relying upon the
earlier decision in NAACP v. Alabama,12 8 argued that the statute infringed the right of the NAACP and its members and lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting persons to seek legal redress for deprivation of constitutional rights. In response, the state of Virginia
127. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
In that case, the Supreme Court recognized a right
128. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
of association to advocate public and private points of view, and reversed a contempt

order granted under a state statute which required foreign corporations to file corporate
charters and designate agents for service of process. The state court's order required
the NAACP to produce records and papers, including membership lists. The NAACP
refused to comply and was held in contempt. The Supreme Court reversed the contempt judgment and held that absent a compelling state interest the members' First and

Fourteenth Amendments rights were paramount.
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argued that the court decree, issued under the statute, did not purport to prohibit all litigation by the NAACP. Thus the NAACP's right
to seek vindication by litigation had not been infringed.
The Supreme Court decided for the defendants, holding that the
First Amendment right of association to advance "beliefs and ideas"
included the right of association for purposes of litigation as well. Accordingly, any federal or state action which has the effect of curtailing
such rights can be sustained only upon a showing of powerful countervailing interests by the state.12 9 The Court expressly recognized that
effective litigation was dependent upon the ability to associate to pursue it, stating:
As construed by the [Virginia] Court, Chapter 33, at least
potentially, prohibits every cooperative activity that would make
advocacy of litigation meaningful. If there is an internal tension
between proscription and protection in the statute, we cannot
assume that, in its subsequent enforcement, ambiguities will be
resolved in favor of adequate protection of First Amendment
rights. Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are
suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area
so closely touching our most precious freedoms. 130

Justice Harlan, who dissented in -the case on the ground that he
attached greater weight to the claimed state interest, had no quarrel
with the principles of the majority decision. On this point, he stated:
Freedom of expression embraces more than the right of an
individual to speak his mind. It includes also his right to advocate and his right to join with his fellows in an effort to make
that advocacy effective. And just as it includes the right jointly
to petition the legislature for redress of grievances, so it must include the right to join together for purposes of obtaining legal redress. We have passed the point where litigation is regarded as
an evil that must be avoided if some accommodation short of a
lawsuit can be worked out. Litigation is often the desirable, and
orderly way of resolving disputes of broad public significance and of
obtaining vindication of fundamental rights.' 3 '
In Button the Supreme Court recognized that the right of an aggrieved individual to sue can be no more than an empty boast in a
number of not uncommon situations. When the victim of a legal
wrong is ignorant, impecunious, or his claim financially insubstantial,
suit is, for all practical purposes, impossible. When people associate,
129. The fundamental rights of the First Amendment are, of course, incorporated
in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby protected from
infringement by the laws and actions of state and local government. See, e.g., Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
130. 371 U.S. at 437-38 (citations omitted).
131. Id. at 452-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting (citations omitted).
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however, to pool resources and information, the situation is drastically
changed. The Court recognized, in short, a right of access to the
courts and the further right to associate for the purpose of litigation
if such association is the only means of securing such meaningful
access. In those situations where it is vital to securing meaningful
access to the courts, such association is a matter of right protected by
13 2
the First Amendment.
Subsequent decisions have taken the view that the right to associate to meaningfully participate in the litigation process is to be given
a broad scope and cannot be limited by fine distinctions. Thus, it
is immaterial whether the right asserted through litigation is of federal
or state origin. 13 3 Likewise it is immaterial whether the group involved referred its members to private attorneys, or actually employed
the attorneys itself on a salary basis.'1 4 Even more significantly, the
Court has clarified the point that the crucial First Amendment activity is
the right to associate for purposes of litigation, regardless of the nature of
the right sought to be advanced by litigation. In Button the Court went
to some lengths to characterize the litigation itself as a form of political
expression. However, in United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Associations,'3 5 in 1967, the Supreme Court expressly stated that the protected right includes association for the purpose of effectively prosecuting
the most mundane of statutory claims. In that case the group had employed attorneys for the purpose of assisting its members in the prosecution of workmen's compensation claims.
As is the case with other fundamental rights, when a statute is
found to inhibit the constitutionally guaranteed right to associate for
purposes of litigation, the claim that the statute is an honest legislative attempt to solve a bona fide state problem is unavailing. It makes
no difference that inhibition of the right is only an "incidental effect"
of the statute-its constitutional infirmity remains. As stated in
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association:
[B]road rules framed to protect the public and to preserve
respect for the administration of justice can in their actual operation significantly impair the value of associational freedoms.
Thus, in Button . . . [w]e held the dangers of baseless litigation
and conflicting interests between the association and individual
litigants far too speculative to justify the broad remedy invoked by
132.
133.
134.
Bar, 377
135.

See United Transportation Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971).
UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967).
Compare Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
U.S. 1 (1964), with UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
389 U.S. 217 (1967).
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the State, a remedy that would have seriously crippled the efforts
of the NAACP to vindicate the rights of its members in court. 1 6
These developments, Boddie's right of access to the courts and
Button's right to meaningfully participate in the litigation process
through association, have powerful implications for the consideration
of class action procedures. In the vast majority of consumer class actions the nature of the wrong and the status of the plaintiffs render
the prospect of individual suits as remote and unlikely as in NAACP

v. Button or the other cases mentioned.

As in those cases, the only

way to give meaning to the right to bring suit is to permit association
for the purpose of litigation. Thus, it can be strongly argued that the

right to associate for the purpose of litigation logically includes a right
to participate in class actions if this is the only method by which the
individual class members can, as a practical matter, gain access to the
courts.137 One consequence of this argument is that impediments to
class action procedures, whether of statutory, judicial or constitutional
origin, should be appraised with conscious regard for their inhibitory
effect upon the right to associate to litigate which enjoys the status
of a fundamental liberty protected by the First Amendment.
D.

Analyzing the Three Critical Holdings of the Eisen MII Decision
1.

Individual Notice and the Requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)

Once plaintiff has made the four basic showings prerequisite
to a class action, 138 he may maintin the action on a class basis only
by additionally satisfying at least one in a second series of requirements set forth in either Rule 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3). 3 9
136. Id. at 222-23.
137. A possible rebuttal to this argument is that the right of association developed
in the Button line of cases involved voluntary association, while in mass wrong class
actions, most of the class members neither voluntarily join the class nor know of the
existence of the litigation. However, assuming that the wrong is proved, and that litigation costs preclude individual suits, a presumption that victims would join the class
if they knew of the wrong does not seem unwarranted. A court's conclusion that the
representative plaintiff adequately represents the interests and desires of the class,
coupled with the fact that the named party does voluntarily associate with the class,
gives additional support to this "presumption of volition."
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a): "Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."
139. F.D. R. Civ. P. 23(b): "Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be
maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and
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In the majority of damage actions, the (b)(1) and (b)(2) routes
will be unavailable, 4 ' and plaintiff must them meet the requirements
of (b)(3). The requirements for the notice which a plaintiff must
give to other members of the class which he hopes to represent in
an action maintained under Rule 23(b)(3) are set out in 23(c)(2)
as follows:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the
court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort .... 141
in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that
a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A)
the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management
of class action."
140. In Eisen I, Judge Medina discussed the inapplicability of (b)(1) and
(b)(2): "Subsection (b)(1)(A) authorizes a class action if 'the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members would create a risk of * * * inconsistent
or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.' Plaintiff
has effectively rebutted his own argument [that (b)(1)(A) applies] because he admits
that individual actions could not be brought as the small claimants who constitute the
entire class could not, on an individual basis, afford the expense of lengthy antitrust
litigation. Under these circumstances there is little danger that individual suits will establish 'incompatible standards of conduct' for the defendants. Subsection (b)(2) was
never intended to cover cases like the instant one where the primary claim is for damages, but is only applicable where the relief sought is exclusively or predominantly injunctive or declaratory." 391 F.2d at 564.
For further discussion and comparison of 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), see Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 100-04 (1966) (Advisory Committee's
Notes, Rule 23).
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
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The purpose of this notice is to permit potential class members
to "opt-out" of the class and thereby to avoid the res judicata effect
which would otherwise attach to a final judgment in an action prose142
cuted under (b)(3).
Rule 23(c)(2) directs "individual notice to all members who can
be identified through reasonable effort" in a 23(b)(3) class action.
The district court in Eisen found that the names and addresses of approximately two million class members could be identified with reasonable effort1 43 but, as noted above, directed actual notice to only a very
small proportion of the identifiable group and ordered published
notice to the rest.
In reversing the district court's holding, Judge Medina ruled that
subsection (c)(2) gives a trial judge no discretion on the form of
notice in those situations where the identities of some or all of the
absentee class members can, through reasonable efforts, be ascertained. In such cases, in Judge Medina's view, individual notice must
be sent. In the case before him, some two million class members
could be identified from defendant's records, and thus individual
notice was required for all two million. The judge also stated, "this
phase of amended Rule 23 has decided constitutional overtones 1 44
indicating a belief that a court would be unable to give (c)(2) a flexible interpretation even if it thought the statutory language would permit it.
Thus Judge Medina's ruling on the notice question has two facets:
(1) his implied belief that Rule 23(c)(2) as written states a constitutional standard; 145 and (2) his holding that the language of the rule
clearly and unambiguously requires actual notice to all identifiable
members in all cases, regardless of the difficulty of providing such
notice. 46 These two problems will now be discussed in the order
stated.
(a) ConstitutionalNotice Requirements
Whether the Constitution requires individual notice in (b)(3)
142. FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (c)(3) provides that a judgment in an action maintained
as a class action under (b) (3) includes all persons who are found (1) to be members
of the class, (2) to have received the notice required by the statute, and (3) not to
have requested exclusion from the class. Rule 23(c) (3) codifies common law res judicata principles. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 86 (1942).
143. 52 F.R.D. at 257.
144. 479 F.2d at 1015.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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type class actions has been debated since Rule 23 was promulgated.
Judge Medina holds the view that (c)(2) does embody a due process
requirement that no person can be bound by the results of a court
action if that person (1) was identifiable at the time of the action
148
and (2) did not receive individual notice of the action.

Such a view must logically be based upon the premise that if individual notice of the court action is received by the person involved,
that person will take the requisite action to protect his interests, either
withdrawing from or continuing in the litigation. This premise
appears valid in reference to the traditional concept of civil litigation
as being a contest between legally aware and financially highly motivated parties. However, in the mass wrong consumer class action,
the members of the plaintiff class are almost certain to be neither
aware of their rights nor, individually, financially highly motivated.
To specify the requirements of the due process clause on the basis
of an abstract, ideal concept while ignoring the realities of the situation
before the court is a basic and grievous error in Judge Medina's thinking. As will be discussed, this basic error leads to a number of inaccurate conclusions.
In contrast to Judge Medina's view, the strong consensus among
commentators is that the notice requirements of due process, as articulated in Hansberry v. Lee 49 and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co. 150 are exceeded by the literal language of Rule 23, and
that the drafters misread Mullane and Hansberry by failing to take
into account the factual peculiarities and certain key passages in those
15
cases.
147.

Most frequently cited for the proposition that individual notice is a constitu-

tional requirement is Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 107 (Advisory

Committee's Notes).
Contrary views are expressed in Maraist & Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled
Marriage: Due Process and the Class Action, 49 TEXAs L. REV. 1 (1970); Pomerantz,
The "Notice to the Class" Under the Amended Rule 23, 1968 PRACTICING LAW INST.
33 (1968); Comment, Constitutional and Statutory Requirements of Notice Under
Rule 23(c)(c), 10 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 571, 573 (1969); Note, Class Actions
Under Federal 23(b)(3)-The Notice Requirement, 29 MD. L. REV. 139, 153-54 (1969);
Comment, Adequate Representation Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 889, 914
(1968).
148. 479 F.2d at 1015. The Notes of the Advisory Committee with respect to
the 1966 amendments of Rule 23 are in apparent accord. 39 F.R.D. 69, 106-107
(1966).

149.

311 U.S. 32 (1940).

150.

339 U.S. 306 (1950).

151.

See Maraist & Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled Marriage: Due Process

and the Class Action, 49 TEXAs L. REV. 1 (1970);

Pomerantz, The "Notice to the
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Mullane involved a judicial settlement of a "common trust fund"
(a statutory device whereby a multitude of small private trusts may
be consolidated under one trustee to achieve economies of administra-

tion) in which the only notice given to all beneficiaries, known or unknown, actual or potential, was by publication. 152 The statute authorizing such notice was held to deny due process to "known beneficiaries
whose whereabouts are also known .. .,,53
".
The arguments that
a strict reading of the language of (c) (2) is not compelled by Mullane

are: (1) The Mullane court itself disclaims any intent to establish a rigid
rule applicable in all cases; 5 4 (2) In Mullane the trustee was in

regular communication with the beneficiaries, so that the giving of
notice was cheap and easy; 15 5 (3) In Mullane the interests of the various beneficiaries were distinctly adverse to one another, so that lack
of notice created a real danger of inadequate representation; 15 (4)
Mullane involved a relatively small number of beneficiaries (only 113
trusts were involved); 1 57 and (5) The interests of the beneficiaries
in Mullane were quantitatively of a substantial nature, unlike the

majority of class actions of which Eisen's diminutive seventy dollar
claim is typical. 58
Furthermore, it has been noted that the Mullane court adopted
a "balancing" approach, weighing "the interests of the State in bringClass" Under the Amended Rule 23, 1968 PRAcTIciNo LAw INST. 33 (1968); Comment,
Constitutional and Statutory Requirements of Notice Under Rule 23(c)(c), 10 B.C.
IND. & Coamm. L. REv. 571, 573 (1969); Note, Class Actions Under Federal 23(b)(3)
-The Notice Requirement, 29 MD. L. REv. 139, 153-54 (1969); Comment, Adequate
Representation Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 889, 914 (1968). It is clear that
the language of (c)(2) is predicated upon the drafters' perception of the principles established in Mullane and Hansberry. See Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39
F.R.D. 69, 107 (Advisory Committee's Notes).
152. 339 U.S. at 309.
153. Id. at 320.
154. The Mullane Court states: "The Court has not committed itself to any
formula achieving a balance between these interests in a particular proceeding or determining when constructive notice may be utilized or what test it must meet. Personal
service has not in all circumstances been regarded as indispensable to the process due
to residents, and it has more often been held unnecessary as to nonresidents." Id. at
314. For a thorough analysis of these arguments and an excellent discussion of this
topic in general, see Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 H-nv. L. Rnv. 426, 433-41 (1973).
155. 339 U.S. at 318.
156. See id.at310.
157. Id. at 309.
158. The 113 trusts in Mullane contained an aggregate gross capital of almost
$3,000,000. Id. The trusts averaged, therefore, approximately $26,500 in capital.
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ing any issues to a final settlement and the interests of those involved
in the action in receiving notice."' 59 In the class action context, this
would involve balancing the interests of society in permitting a final

resolution of claims of mass fraud or similar large-scale wrongs and
the interests of individual class member victims in receiving opt-out
notice. While in the traditional civil litigation situation the interests
of the parties in receiving such a court notice would indeed be substantial, such is not the case for members of the plaintiff class in a
mass wrong consumer suit. The interests of such class members in
receiving individual notice will generally be nil. From a realistic eco-

nomic standpoint, separate individual lawsuits are totally unfeasible;
therefore, "opting out" is not a viable alternative. The interest of
society, however, in resolving allegations of mass fraud and the like
is great indeed, due to the therapeutic benefits of such suits mentioned
above. Thus, the establishment in Eisen III of severe due process
requirements is misconceived as a matter of the constitutional requirements established in Mullane."6 '
159. Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87
HRv. L. REv. 426, 434 (1973). This view is entirely sustainable from the language
of the case:
"Personal service of written notice within the jurisdiction is the classic form
of notice always adequate in any proceeding. But the vital interest of the State in
bringing any issues as to its fiduciaries to a final settlement can be served only if
interests or claims of individuals who are outside of the State can somehow be determined. A construction of the Due Process Clause which would place impossible or
impractical obstacles in the way could not be justified.
Against this interest of the State we must balance the individual interest sought
to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. This is defined by our holding that
'the fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.' This
right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is
pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.
The Court has not committed itself to any formula achieving a balance between
these interests in a particular proceeding." 339 U.S. at 313-14 (citations omitted).
160. Judge Medina acknowledges that Mullane expressly sanctions published notice
in certain circumstances but contends that the Mullane rule was "refined" by the following language in Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1962). "The
general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice by publication is not
enough with respect to a person whose name and address are known or very easily ascertainable and whose legally protected interests are directly affected by the proceedings
in question." 479 F.2d at 1017 n.21.
Judge Medina's reference to Schroeder does not reveal that Schroeder was an eminent domain case in which lack of individual notice worked a substantial forfeiture of
the plaintiff's rights in real property. The basic premise of this article is that there
is a fundamental difference between actions involving substantial individual property interests, like Schroeder, and mass actions in which individual property interests are negligible, like Eisen. When this difference is recognized, courts will be able to undertake
a due process analysis which is responsive to the realities of the actions being consid-
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It is also apparent that Hansberry v. Lee does not establish an
unvarying constitutional requirement of actual individual notice to all
identifiable litigants. Respondents in that case were property owners
who had signed a racially restrictive covenant which provided that it
should not be effective unless signed by the owners of 95 percent of
the frontage within the area subject to the covenant. They sought
to enjoin breach of the covenant by petitioners, who were black. Petitioners defended on the ground that owners of 95 percent of the frontage had not signed the agreement, but respondents argued, and the
Illinois Supreme Court held, that the issue was resolved by the doctrine of res judicata. This holding was based on the fact that parties to
a prior suit to enjoin a breach of the agreement had stipulated, albeit
161
erroneously, that the 95 percent requirement had been met.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the finding of res
judicata, not on the grounds that petitioners had not received notice
of the prior proceeding, but because their interests had not been adequately protected therein. 62 On this point the Court recognized "the
dual and potentially conflicting interests of those who are putative parties to the agreement in compelling or resisting its performance
,103 The limits of the rule in the case were stated in these
rather precise terms:
With a proper regard for divergent local institutions and interests, this Court is justified in saying that there has been a failure of due process only in those cases where it cannot be said that
the procedure adopted, fairly insures -the protection of the interests
of absent parties who are bound by it.164
The clear implication is that the absence of an opportunity to participate would not be fatal as a matter of due process in situations where
the interests of the absentees were harmonious with those of the parties to the suit. In such cases, assuming the class representative adequately represents his own interests, the interests of the absentees
would ipso facto be adequately protected, and the sine qua non of
due process as stated in Hansberry satisfied. Applying this approach
to the language of Rule 23, the requirement in the Rule that the
named party adequately represent the interests of the class'0 5 satisfies
ered; the inapplicability of decisions such as Schroeder, in the class action context, will
then become clear.
161. 311U.S. at 39.
162. Id. at 45-46.
163. Id. at 44.
164. Id. at 42 (citations omitted).
165. FD.R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4). For the text of Rule 23(a) see note 138 supra.
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the rule in the Hansberry decision. Thus, even if Rule 23 contained
no notice requirement, it could still be said, in the words of Hansberry,
that Rule 23 "fairly insures the protection of the absent parties who
are bound by it." It is therefore, in the words of one commentator,
"difficult to understand why the Advisory Committee viewed this case
as establishing a due process requirement of notice to absentees in
order to enable them to 'opt out,' "166 and it is also difficult to subscribe to Judge Medina's belief that the language of (c)(2) prescribing notice embodies a constitutional standard.
(b) The Notice Requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)
Freed from the imagined strictures of the due process clause, it
is now appropriate to consider possible interpretations of (c)(2).
Arguably, a more flexible approach than that taken by Judge Medina
is desirable on grounds of policy and the wording of Rule 23. Certainly if one accepts the premise that the "historic mission of the class
action is to help the smaller guy," a rigid construction of the notice
requirements of Rule 23, which imposes a barrier in the form of very
substantial costs, clearly would frustrate the purpose of the statute.
As Eisen amply illustrates, where the number of identifiable
members in a class is extremely large, a requirement that each receive
individual notice will for all practical purposes preclude the continuance of the suit as a class action.' 6 7 The prospect of any appreciable
number of subsequent individual suits by members of the class is small
indeed. Thus, short of enforcement by government agencies, there
is no remedy for a class whose aggregate small losses make up a huge
ill-gotten profit for some corporate wrongdoer. The question of notice
requirements, then, may well be the single most important problem
under Rule 23.
The interpretation adopted in Eisen III, ironically, may serve to
encourage perpetrators of mass frauds to keep detailed records of the
names and addresses of all their victims, so that they may all be found
to be indentifiable "through reasonable effort." The victims would
therefore be entitled to individual notice, and thus in their multitudes
be unable, due to notice expenses, to obtain any relief at all. While
it is, of course, dangerous to attack any rule on the basis that it extrapolates to absurd consequences, the fact remains that one of the pur166. Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule:
Elfectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. Rnv. 889, 911
(1968).
167. Assuming plaintiff pays. See text accompanying notes 176-188 infra.
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poses of class actions will be defeated by a strict construction of the
notice requirements of Rule 23.
Candor requires the concession that, even where a mass wrong
class action such as Eisen is permitted to proceed to a judgment, the
likelihood of individual claims being filed by a substantial portion of
the class is remote indeed. But the failure of the individual members
of the class to recover their damages will afford little consolation to
the defendant who under the fluid class concept has been required
to pay over the gross damages suffered by the class as a whole. Ob,viously, the therapeutic benefit theory supports this argument for class
actions. The persuasiveness of the theory in resolving the question
of what type of notice is required in a given class action case involves
a weighing of the potential therapeutic effects on the industry involved
if the litigation proceeds as a class action against the extent to which
the interests of absentee members will be prejudiced by a failure to
receive individual notice.
Regarding the interests of absentee class members there are two
arguments that they will not be significantly prejudiced by a relaxation of the literal language of 23(c)(2). The first, voiced by Judge
Oakes in his dissent from the denial of the rehearing petition, is that
there is no proof that published notice is ineffective.'0 8 He therefore
takes vehement issue with Judge Medina's assertion that such notice
"is a farce,"' 9 and concludes that Rule 23 was not meant to require
"perfect or total notification. 1 7 0
The second argument is that, as mentioned above, even if absentee class members are never effectively made aware of the suit, they
are in no way prejudiced because they would neither have sued, nor,
in all probability, have heard about their rights anyway. In another
context, the Eisen III court points out that, out of six million victims,
Morton Eisen was the lone voice of protest.17 1 Whatever the implications
to be drawn from this fact, the Eisen situation is typical of mass wrong
168. 479 F.2d at 1023-24.
169. Id. at 1024 (Oakes, J., dissenting). Judge Oakes states: "to say [that published notice is a farce] without any supporting data or authority, strikes me as . . .
a 'rhetorical device.'" Id. Judge Oakes points to notices of probate proceedings as
one common example of effective notice by publication. He also argues that if published notice was effective and legally sufficient in the settlement of West Virginia v.
Charles Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971), where absent class members were ordinary
consumers, then such notice should be sufficient in a case such as Eisen, in which the
members of the class are securities investors, a presumably more sophisticated group.
170. Id. at 1024.
171. Id. at 1010.
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class actions where few members of the class are aware of the wrong,
and the informed few are likely to be disinclined to go to court over
their small claims. Thus, the argument that absentee class members
will be unconstitutionally prejudiced is deficient in a manner with
which we are now familiar: it avoids the realities of the situation and
focuses on concepts derived from "traditional" litigation.
Thus the "harm" suffered by the members of the class as a result of a less demanding interpretation of Rule 23 is minimal. It is far
outweighed by the substantial therapeutic benefits to be gained by
adoption of a more realistic interpretation of the notice provisions of
the Rule.
Turning to the explicit wording of the section we see that it is
certainly a permissible construction of the section to read it merely
as offering "individual notice to those who are reasonably identifiable"
as an example of what might constitute the best notice practicable.
Certainly "practicality" is mentioned in such a way that a reasonable
reading of the section would require a court to (1) give the best notice
which (2) was practicable in the situation, and among the possible
forms of "best notice" would be individual notice to those class mem172
bers who can be identified with reasonable effort.
(c)

The Effect of the Right to Litigate

To recapitulate, we have concluded, contrary to Judge Medina,
that neither the Constitution nor the language of Rule 23(c)(2) prohibits a liberal reading of the Rule's notice provisions. The argument
will now be made that a liberal interpretation of Rule 23's notice requirements is in fact compelled by the presence of the right of meaningful access to the courts as a limitation on the power of the judiciary
and the legislature to impose insuperable procedural obstacles to litigation.
The net combined effect of the Boddie and Button cases might
be stated as follows: where judicial relief is the only feasible means
of dispute resolution, a validly enacted statute which has the practical
effect of denying access to the courts will, absent a significant countervailing interest, be struck down as unconstitutional in its application;
particularly when such judicial relief is achievable only through associational activities and the statute has the effect of inhibiting such
172. See Note, Managing the Large Class Action, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
87 HARv. L. REv. 426, 440 (1973); Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and
the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws,
116 U. PA.L. REV. 889, 917 (1968).
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association. Thus, the interests of the state in preserving high ethical
standards in the legal profession, and in financing court administration through the imposition of fees upon litigation, were in those
cases, held secondary to the right of meaningful access to the courts.
In considering the (c)(2) notice requirement, an understanding
of this right suggests that a proper approach would begin with an inquiry into the extent to which meaningful access to the courts will be
inhibited by a notice requirement which imposes what will often be
On
insurmountable obstacles to the plaintiff class representatives.
this point, it is everywhere recognized that in the great majority of
class actions, refusal to permit the suit to proceed on a class basis is
"tantamount to a denial of private relief."'173 Indeed, that is the express rationale of the "death-knell" opinion (Eisen I) mentioned
above. 174 Thus, it is clear that a strict notice requirement does significantly inhibit meaningful access to the courts, and has the effect of
denying the right to associate into classes for purposes of litigation.
It remains, however, to consider the countervailing interest which
the statute was enacted to protect. The countervailing interest supporting a rigid interpretation of (c)(2) is the protection of the due
process rights of absentee class members. 175 However, we have seen
that the due process rights to notice of civil litigation depend upon
a balancing of factors and due to the small claims and ignorance of
the class members their interest in obtaining individual notice is minimal. Certainly their interest in such notice is less substantial than that
of the state in financing its court administration, asserted in Boddie,
and no more substantial than the claimed state concern over legal
ethics in Button. Thus, rather than being required by the due process
clause, the Eisen III construction of (c)(2), which precludes continuance of the suit as a class action and effectively bars the class members
from the litigation process, arguably constitutes a denial of the due
process rights of the members of the class.
173. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), quoting J.1. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
174. See note 26 supra.
175. It is ironic that this argument is advanced by defendants on behalf of potential members of the plaintiff class. Defendants thus seek to avoid liability by heated
advocacy of the constitutional rights of those who claim to be their victims. This bizarre situation is made possible by the court's rigid adherence to the fiction that the
interests of absentee class members will somehow be prejudiced by a failure to receive
notice. When it is realized that absentee class members have no interest in receiving
notice, then it will be apparent that defendant's argument has no basis in reality. Thus
the irony of defendant asserting plaintiff's rights is symptomatic of a failure to perceive, in realistic terms, the interests which are truly at stake in a class action.
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Allocation of Notice Costs

In an effort to achieve a fair allocation of the costs of notice,
Judge Tyler held a preliminary "mini-hearing on the merits," despite
the explicit direction by the Second Circuit in Eisen II that plaintiff
was to bear the costs." 6 Concluding from the hearing that plaintiff
was likely to win any subsequent full-scale trial on the merits, he
ordered defendant to bear 90 percent of the notice costs, and plaintiff
the balance.
The Second Circuit rejected this procedure on a number of
grounds. The most basic was that since Eisen II had remanded only
for the purpose of a determination as to whether the requirements of
a class action had been met, the preliminary mini-hearing on the merits was conducted without jurisdiction."' The most important substantive ground, however, was that "no provision is made in amended
Rule 23 for any such mini, preliminary or other hearing on the
merits." 178
The issue of whether costs of (c)(2) notice can be assessed
against a defendant is one of the most perplexing aspects of revised
Rule 23. The practical effect of the issue would, of course, be lessened if the liberal approach to the individual notice requirements mentioned above is adopted.' 79 Notwithstanding the adoption of a discretionary interpretation, in many cases notice expenses would still be
very large indeed.1 8 ° Both sides can make a strong argument that
having to bear the burden of notice costs prior to a final determination
of liability would be onerous and unfair.
The clear consensus in the commentaries is that plaintiff should
bear the burden, 8" a position with which the Second Circuit is in general agreement. However, the basis for the court's position is very
unclear. In Eisen III the court expressly concedes that there may be
class actions in which plaintiff should not be required to bear all notice
176. 391 F.2d at 568.
177. 479 F.2d at 1016.
178. Id.
179. For example, the (c)(2) notice ordered by Judge Tyler was expected to involve an expense of $21,720. 52 F.R.D. at 263. By contrast, individual notice to each
class member who was reasonably identifiable was estimated at one point to involve
an expenditure of $400,000. 391 F.2d at 568.
180. These cases would involve large classes with substantial claims and/or posbly conflicting interests.
181. See, e.g., Ward & Elliott, The Contents and Mechanics of Rule 23 Notice,
10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 557 (1969); Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 23, The Class Action Device and Its Utilization, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 631 (1970).

May 19741

CONSUMER PROTECTION AND CLASS ACTIONS

1399

costs.18 2 It then gratuitously adds a puzzling reference to a statement
in the Advisory Committee's notes that "the provisions for notice in
amended Rule 23 were intended to comply with constitutional requirements."'8 3 Thus, the clear implication arises that the allocation of
notice costs involves constitutional considerations, but the discussion
preceding the implying statement made no mention of such considerations. The statement of the Advisory Committee is also irrelevant because the question as to who should pay costs has nothing to do with
the question as to what notice is sufficient to comply with the requirements of due process. Adding further confusion on this issue is the
fact that Judge Hays, who concurred in the result in Eisen Ill, did
so on the sole ground that the defendants would not be reimbursed
for the expenditure of 90 percent of the cost of notice even if they
prevailed. 8 4 Although unfortunately brief, Judge Hays' concurrence
is tantalizing and seems to indicate the possible constitutional problems
with any order requiring the defendant to pay all or part of the costs
of notice to the members of the plaintiff class.
Simply stated, the defendant can only lose under an order of the
type made by Judge Tyler. If the plaintiff class prevails, the defendant has, of course, no right to be reimbursed. If the defendant wins,
he probably has no right to such full reimbursement from the named
class representatives since the costs incurred were not all for the
named representative's benefit. While, in theory, the defendant
would have a right to seek full reimbursement from the entire class,
in an Eisen situation where a large portion of the class is unidentifiable,
the defendant would never be able to collect the full notice costs he
incurred from all of the class members. Even assuming that a large
proportion of such a class could be located after a judgment against
the class (a rather improbable assumption) what amount would be
collected from each? In all probability, in the usual mass fraud situation, the defendant as a practical matter could not obtain reimbursement. Thus, he would be deprived of property, (the money which
paid the cost of notice) on the basis of a procedure which is something
less than a full and fair hearing on the merits. He could therefore
argue persuasively that his due process rights had been violated.
On the other hand, the named plaintiff representative of the class
may not be able to afford to pay the costs of notice even in the situation when a court has certified the class as being proper. For the
182. 479 F.2d at 1009 n.5.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1020.
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same considerations mentioned above, it would indeed be unfortunate
if the practical difficulties of financing notice foreclosed an otherwise
valid class action.
There is no simple solution to the problem, but when a particular
approach is adopted it should be carefully reasoned. Judge Medina
fails to do this and further confuses the issue of notice costs by treating the allocation of notice costs and the preliminary hearing separately. Judge Tyler held the mini-hearing in order to determine who
should bear the costs of notice, but Judge Medina treated the two
problems in isolation. Thus, his authority for rejecting Judge Tyler's
mini-hearing was Miller v. Mackey International,Inc., 18 5 a case which
involved a wholly different problem. In that class action, the district
court had, at the (c)(1) "maintenance hearings," considered the
merits of plaintiffs claim, rather than whether plaintiff had met the
requirements of Rule 23. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed, properly pointing out that the merits were
not to be considered in determining whether plaintiff had met the requirements of Rule 23.
In fact, the preliminary mini-hearing as used by Judge Tyler was
unprecedented. There was no authority to support it, and none
opposed to it. It does, however, appear to reflect the kind of resourcefulness and exercise of judicial discretion contemplated by the
drafters of Rule 23.
As has been pointed out before,' 8 6 the failure of Rule 23 to provide for such a mini-hearing procedure does not operate as an implicit
proscription. Particularly in view of the equitable nature of class actions, and the encouragement which the draftsmen of Rule 23 gave
to judges to exercise their ingenuity with an eye toward effectuating
statutory purpose, the summary rejection of this procedure by the
Second Circuit seems inappropriate.
This inappropriateness is particularly acute in view of the right
of meaningful access to the courts which was, of course, neglected by
Judge Medina. The proper analysis of due process requirements regarding cost allocation is similar to that used on notice requirements,
above, and certainly the total imposition of notice costs on the representative plaintiff may significantly inhibit the availability of judicial
relief. However, the defendant's countervailing interest appears to be
far more substantial than the presumed due process rights of absen185.

452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971).

186. Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87
HAv. L. REv. 426, 443 (1973).
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tee class members. There is a very real danger, as pointed out above,
that a defendant who is forced to bear the burden of notice costs and
then wins on the merits will be unable to recoup those expenses. The
choice is by no means clear. The cases conflict, but those which
apportion at least a share of the notice costs to the defendant appear,
in general, to have undertaken a more thoughtful approach to the
7
problem.'
It appears by far the preferable solution to approach the problem
with an eye to the peculiarities of each case. It may be that regular
correspondence between the defendant and the individual class members would greatly diminish the dimensions of the problem. Or a preliminary hearing on the merits may be employed, and when the evidence adduced therein was overwhelming one way or another, it
would seem the least of the evils to allocate the bulk of the notice
costs to the party who had made the weaker showing. Perhaps a summary judgment standard could be used in such a hearing in order to
overcome due process objections to requiring defendant to shoulder
a portion of the financial burden. In any case, it appears that some
such approach is infinitely preferable to closing the courthouse doors
to a clearly meritorious claim simply because plaintiff cannot afford
the costs of notice.' 8 8
3.

The Fluid ClassRecovery Concept

One of the matters "pertinent" to a finding that a class action
is "superior," under 23(b), to other methods of relief, is the existence
of difficulties likely to be encountered in the "management" of the
class action.""9 Judge Lombard had dissented in Eisen II, contending that the number of individual claims likely to be filed by class
members, even assuming a judgment against defendant, was so small
that the aggregate claims would be far exceeded by the costs of administering the action. On this basis he argued that the class action
was "unmanageable."' 90
Judge Tyler's solution to this problem was to adopt the "fluid
187. The most thoughtful judicial handling of this problem appears to be that of
Judge Mansfield in Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
188. It is interesting to note that in California a specific and rather detailed class
action for consumer abuse situations was legislated in 1970. This procedure expressly
gives the court the power to allocate notice costs in its discretion to either plaintiff
or defendant. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1781(d) (West Supp. 1974). The validity of this
legislative grant of discretion is, of course, called into question by Eisen III.
189. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). See note 139 supra.
190. See 391 F.2d at 571 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
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class recovery," under which gross damages were to be assessed based
on the injury to the class as a whole.1 9 ' Defendant's liability would
thus not be limited to the aggregate of claims filed by individual members, but would include the entire damages suffered by the class, as
ascertained from defendant's own records. 1 92 The class members
would then receive individual notice, to be financed at that point
out of the established total recovery. Each could then come forward
to establish the amount of his individual claim against the gross
198
award.
191.
192.

52 F.R.D. at 262, 264.
52 F.R.D. at 262. Judge Taylor also noted other sources of information

from which damages could be computed, namely:

SEC, REPORT

OF

SPECIAL STUDY

OF

H.R. Doc. No. 95, Pt. 2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); records
of the NYSE Special Committee on Odd Lots; and a cost study of the odd-lot industry
conducted for the NYSE by Price Waterhouse & Co.
193. Assessment of gross damages against a defendant when that sum
is ascertainable without the testimony of individual class members will be referred to in this article as "fluid class recovery." Other expressions have been
employed to describe this procedure, notably "lump sum recovery," a phrase
used by Professor Arthur Miller. Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial
Belief in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b)(3), 54 F.R.D. 501 (1972). This
article adopts the nomenclautre used by both Judge Tyler and Judge Medina. The
gross money award itself has often been informally referred to as the "pot of gold,"
partially in recognition of its attractiveness to private attorneys representing large
classes, whose fees depend in part upon the dimensions of the classs recovery.
Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967),
is a good illustration of the mechanics of fluid class recovery. To simplify the facts
slightly, plaintiff alleged that defendant had adjusted its taxicab meters to register rates
in excess of those approved by the Public Utilities Commission. Plaintiff, claiming to
represent a class consisting of all of defendant's customers, sought damages equal to
the total amount of the unlawful overcharges. The court, in ruling on defendant's demurrer, assumed the truth of plaintiffs allegation that the exact amount of the overcharge could be ascertained from defendant's records.
Under traditional notions, defendant's liability would have been limited to the aggregate of individual claims actually filed by individual cab users. Thus, even though
defendant's own records may have disclosed a total unlawful overcharge of $100,000,
if the aggregate sum of individual claims actually filed subsequnt to the judgment were
only $15,000, than that would be the extent of defendant's liability. The California
Supreme Court, however, held that, assuming that the total unlawful overcharge could
be ascertained from defendant's own records, "no appearance by the individual members of the class will be required to recover the full amount of the overcharges . ..."
67 Cal. 2d at 716, 433 P.2d at 747, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 739. Thus, a judgment for plaintiff would render defendant liable for the entire $100,000, even if no other individual
claims were filed.
Disposition of the unclaimed portion of the "pot of gold" after a suitable time for
the filing of individual claims is a separate problem which has received substantial attention in its own right. See, e.g., Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief
in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b)(3), 54 F.R.D. 501 (1972); Note, Damage
Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. Cur. L. REv. 448 (1972).
SECURITIES MARKETS,
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After distinguishing the precedents cited by Judge Tyler for the
fluid class recovery device,' 94 the Second Circuit rejected it as a permissible procedure, stating its entire rationale in one unenlightening
paragraph:
Even if amended Rule 23 could be read so as to permit any
such fantastic procedure, the courts would have to reject it as an
unconstitutional violation of the requirement of due process of law.
But as it now reads amended Rule 23 contemplates and provides
for no such procedure. Nor can amended Rule 23 be construed
or interpreted in such a fashion as to permit such procedure. We
hold the "fluid recovery" concept and practice to be illegal, inadmissible as a solution of -the manageability problems of class actions and wholly improper. 19 5 ;..
Turning first to Judge Medina's dictum to the effect that fluid
class recovery would violate due process of law, it is hard to conceive
that this procedure would prejudice defendant in any unconstitutional
manner. Gross damages, meaning the total amount of illegal profit
received by defendant, would be proved by defendant's own records
to a legal certainty, thus testimony of individual class members would
be neither needed nor relevant. Such would be the case only in situations where the state of mind of individual class members is not relevant in determining the total liability to the class. 196 Given this circumstance, defendant's substantive liability is in.no way altered by his
inability to confront each class member individually. He is liable for
more than he would have been were the injuries of some of his victims allowed to go unrecompensed, but this is certainly not objectionable.
There is precedent for the position that defendant has no constitutional right in such a case to confront each individual class member. As a result of the rash of bank failures in the 1930's a number
of depositors' class suits against insolvent banks were filed. Illinois
state statutes made certain bank stockholders primarily liable for the
bank's debts to its creditors. In a series of cases beginning with Heine
v. Degen,'9 7 the Illinois Supreme Court considered the practice under
which the receiver was authorized to receive from the shareholders
194. 479 F.2d at 1012.
195. Id. at 1018.
196. For example, fluid class recovery would not be proper if the cause of action
involved an element such as the individual reliance (on a false representation) of each
member of the plaintiff class and the law of the jurisdiction required that such reliance
could only be proved by testimony from each class member. In such a case, a procedure
by which defendant was denied the opportunity to examine class members in such a
case would be highly prejudicial.
197. 362 Ill. 357, 199 N.E. 832 (1935).
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the amounts which, according to the bank's books, were found due
the creditors. The shareholders attacked the procedure as a denial
of due process of law, in that they were denied the opportunity to
confront each creditor claimant individually. The analysis of the court
in Lewis v. West Side Trust & Savings Bank 9 ' precisely answers the
argument that fluid class recovery operates to deny the defendant due
process of law.
It must be remembered that these defendants had access to
the books of the bank and an opportunity to show therefrom that
their liabilities should have been further diminished or wiped out
entirely by reason of claims the bank had against its creditors.
They have failed to point out wherein they or any of them suffered
damage by reason of the fact that plaintiffs were not required to
make the proof they insist on. 199
It is submitted, therefore, that the asserted constitutional right
violated by fluid class recovery is a fiction, and thus that it does not
pose a problem for use of the fluid class concept if it otherwise seems
desirable. As discussed previously, the therapeutic effects theory
would clearly establish the desirablility of fluid class recovery class actions even if only a handful of the members of the class actually receive damages. Of course, for those class members who do obtain
recovery, their right to meaningful access to the courts is secured only
by the adoption of fluid class recovery, since there is no practical alternative available. Thus, there is no due process constraint which
would bar the fluid class recovery concept.
Judge Medina's assertion that Rule 23 cannot be read to authorize fluid class recovery is equally unconvincing. The failure of Rule
23 to provide for this remedy can hardly be sufficient, for Rule 23
is utterly silent on the matter of recovery. Indeed, no method of computing damages is contemplated, authorized or prohibited by Rule 23.
Thus a court is free to adopt any theory of recovery in a class action
case without any limitation due to the prescribed procedure. It is
significant that a number of courts have embraced the fluid class concept, although usually in the context of a settlement of the class action
litigation.2"0 However, at least one important decision has accepted
the fluid class recovery concept in contested litigation. Judge Medina's treatment of this precedent, Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,2 1' is highly
198. 376 Ill. 23, 32 N.E.2d 907 (1941).
199. Id. at 32, 32 N.E.2d at 913.
200. Most notable among these is the settlement of the nationwide drug price fixing litigation, West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 314 .F Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), af 'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
201. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
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Judge Medina states first that Daar in-

volved "a state class action statute very different in its phraseology
from amended Rule 23. "202 The state class action statute is indeed
drawn in far more general language than is Rule 23.203 However this
difference is irrelevant because the California statute, like Rule 23,

contains no language relating to class action remedies, and the Daar
decision actually rests upon policy determinations which are applicable
to class actions generally. 20 4 In addition, the Second Circuit decision

is internally inconsistent on this point since if fluid class recovery is
unconstitutional, the appropriate handling of Darr would be to state

that it was incorrectly decided, not that it is merely disinguishable.
Judge Medina then points out that the decision in Daar was on

a demurrer, thus: "the approach to the issues was entirely different
from the making of a judicial determination, on the basis of proof,

of whether or not the requirements of amended Rule 23 had been
met."2 5 This is equally unpersuasive. No proof is necessary to a
determination whether fluid class recovery is or is not a permissible
procedure under Rule 23 and the Constitution. It is not an evidentiary question. The question whether it should be applied in a given

case should not be confused with the question whether it is ever permissible.
Finally, the Second Circuit distinguished Daar on the ground that
the California court was "evidently of the view that the individuals who
had been damaged . . . would ultimately have to prove their separate and individual damages. 20 6 This is even less persuasive than the
202. 479 F.2d at 1012.
203. "If the consent of anyone who should have been joined as plaintiff cannot
be obtained, he may be made a defendant, the reason thereof being stated in the complaint; and when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons,
or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all." CAL. CODE CIV. PRoC.
§ 382 (West 1973).
204. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 715, 433 P.2d 732, 746, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 724, 738 (1967), mentions the therapeutic benefits theory and other arguments
for class actions discussed above. See text accompanying notes 64-101 supra.
205. 479 F.2d at 1012.
206. Id.
Author's Note: On May 28, 1974, the United States Supreme Court rendered an
opinion affirming, with considerable limitations, the Second Circuit's decision. See
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, U.S.-- (1974), 42 U.S.L.W. 4804. As elaborated
hereafter, the Supreme Court's Eisen opinion, written by Justice Powell, passed on only
two of the three issues ruled upon in Eisen III. The Court expressly determined those
issues, the required form of notice and the allocation of -the cost of such notice, on the
narrow ground that the language of Rule 23 did not permit the district court to
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prior arguments. Any fluid class recovery contemplates that individual class members will have to come and prove their injury for their
authorize published notice and require the defendants to pay 90 percent of the cost.
Thus, the specific requirements of the due procss clause in regards to these class action
procedures are still unsettled issues.
The isues are, of course, of great magnitude because Congress will undoubtedly be
asked to consider amending Rule 23 to alter its language in regards to form of notice
and allocation of costs. Such amendments, if they are to be valid, must comply, of
course, with the requirements of the due process clause. Furthermore, certain state
class action statutes, such as California Civil Code Section 1781, deviate significantly
from the relevant language of Rule 23 concerning form of notice and cost allocation.
These statutes must also comply with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court opinion begins with review of the progress of the litigation,
demonstrating, according to Justice Powell, that the case had lived up to Judge Lumbard's characterization of it as a "Frankenstein monster posing as a class action." See
42 U.S.L.W. at 4808. The Court then determined that it had jurisdiction to review
both the district court's order imposing 90 percent of the cost of notice on the defendant
and the district court's ruling that notice of publication was sufficient. See discussion
of this aspect of the Supreme Court's opinion in note 63, supra. The Supreme Court
specifically declined to rule upon Judge Medina's resolution of the issue of manageability and fluid class recovery on the ground that an affirmation of the second circuit's
rulings on the notice requirements of Rule 23 completely disposed of the plaintiff's class
action as initially formed. See footnote 10 of the Supreme Court's opinion at 42
U.S.L.W. 4809.
The Court decided that the specific language of Rule 23 required individual notice
to all class members who could be identified with reasonable effort and that the Rule
could not be read to authorize any procedure by which all or a portion of the notice
costs could be imposed upon defendants. Noting that the plaintiff had consistently
maintained that he would not pay for the cost of individual notice to members of the
class as described in his complaint, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the class action as defined in the plaintiff's complaint. See 42 U.S.L.W. 4811.
On this point, Justice Powell stated that the dismissal of the class action as originally
defined was without prejudice to any further efforts which the plaintiff might wish to
undertake to redefine the class (presumably to include fewer members) and to prosecute the action on behalf of such a newly defined class if the plaintiff was willing to
pay for individual notice to identifiable members of that class. 42 U.S.L.W. 4811.
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, wrote a separate
opinion concurring with the majority holding on the form of notice and the allocation of cost. However, the Douglas opinion dissents from the majority in that it
would not dismiss the class action as originally defined but would remand the case
to the lower court with instructions to preserve the existence of the full class described
in the complaint while formulating an appropriate subclass to which the required individual notice, to be paid for by the named plaintiff, would be given. This newly
formulated subclass would then be authorized to prosecute its class claims against the
defendants to a judgment. The effect of such a subclass judgment upon the rights of the
full class described in the original complaint is not determined in the concurring opinion nor is the appropriate future treatment of the originally described full class discussed.
The Supreme Court's choice to decline to rule on Judge Medina's rejection of
fluid class recovery is indeed unfortunate. Since Judge Medina's rejection of fluid
class recovery was seemingly based upon due process grounds, lawyers and courts
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personal recovery. The burden of the proof would be much lighter
in Eisen than in Daar, since in the former the company's own records
involved in class actions where fluid class recovery appears to be appropriate will be
faced with the question which he raised concerning the constitutional validity of such
a procedure. For the reasons indicated in the text of the article accompanying notes
194-99, it is the author's opinion that due process does not prohibit the use of this
procedure. It should be noted that the strong statement concerning the necessity of
flexible class action procedures in order to provide remedies for small claimants in
mass wrong situations appearing in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion can henceforth
be cited as strong support for the views expressed in this article in support of the
validity of fluid class procedures. See 42 U.S.L.W. 4812-4813.
On the issue of cost allocation, the Supreme Court specifically based its decision
upon the language and history of Rule 23 which, the Court felt, gave no authority to
a trial court to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the action nor to impose costs initially on the defendant. (See 42 U.S.L.W. 4810-4811). As indicated in
the article in the text accompanying notes 179-88, supra, the issue of whether a cost
allocation order complies with the requirements of the due process clause is a difficult
one. Since the Supreme Court makes no allusion to constitutional requirements in its
discussion of the issue, however, the legal community must fall back on the type of
analysis indicated in this article in attempting to resolve it. The issue may eventually
be presented in connection with state statutes such as California Civil Code Section
1781(d). This section specifically gives a trial court the authority to direct either
party to notify members of the class in a consumer class action brought under the
provisions of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act. Whether this statutorily
granted cost allocation discretion is valid under the United States Constitution is
undetermined and the Supreme Court's Eisen opinion furnishes no new guidance on
the question.
In determining the form of notice required by Rule 23(c) (2) the Court declared:
"We think the import of the language is unmistakable. Individual notice must be
sent to all class members whose names and addresses may be ascertained through reasonable effort." 42 U.S.L.W. 4809. Further, the Court states that such notice "is not a
discretionary consideration to be waived in a particular case. It is, rather, an unambiguous requirement of Rule 23." 42 U.S.LW. 4810. This construction, following
the traditional "plain meaning" doctrine of statutory interpretation, clearly and conclusively resolves the question of what form of notice is required by the present
working of Rule 23(c) (2). The Court's further discussion of the issue, discussed
hereafter, is clearly dictum.
The Supreme Court viewed the intent of the drafters of Rule 23, as expressed in
the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23, as bolstering its conclusion that the language
of the Rule requires individual notice. See 42 U.S.L.W. 4809. The Court proceeds
to elaborate the concern of the Advisory Committee that the design of the notice
provisions of Rule 23 incorporate minimum due process requirements. Referring to
the Committee's citation of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950), the Court determines that the drafters believed that the Mullane decision
requires individual notice to known class members as a matter of due process. This
perception of the Committee's belief is shared by most commentators. See notes 147,
148 supra, and accompanying text. As noted in the article, the vast majority of
scholarly commentary does not agree with the implications drawn from Mullane by the
Committee. See footnote 151, supra. Of utmost significance is the fact that the
Supreme Court does not state approval for the reasoning and belief of the Committee.
However, the Court possibly implies such approval by its discussion of a decision
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presumably contained, as to each class member, all the proof necessary, while in Daar (a class suit for taxi fare overcharges), defendant
had no records from which the damages to individual plaintiffs could
be ascertained.

Even assuming, however, that all authorities cited by Judge Tyler
were legitimately distinguishable, it is a question-begging approach,
especially in an area so peculiarly appropriate for the exercise of judicial discretion, to hold that a particular procedure is impermissible simply because it has never been permitted before. The argument that there
is nothing in Rule 23 that prohibits fluid recovery is as valid as the
not cited by the Advisory Committee, Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208
(1962). See discussion of the Schroeder decision in note 160, supra. Schroeder, a decision based upon Mullane as precedent, is viewed by the Court as having established
a general rule of individual notice to known class members. See 42 U.S.L.W. 48094810. However, once again, the Court does not state that the general rule of the
Schroeder decision is compelled by the due process clause.
The reason for the Court's discussion of the concern behind the Committee's
expressed intent and the Schroeder decision is, at a minimum, unclear. However, it
can be speculated that the two most likely reasons for the Court's inclusion of this
section in its opinion are:
(a) The Court may be warning a future Congress desiring to amend Rule 23
that published notice is never sufficient when the names and addresses of class
members are reasonably ascertainable. This reason is unlikely for if the Court
meant to say this, Justice Powell certainly would not have been reticent about
doing so.
(b)
On the other hand, the Court may be warning state and federal draftsmen
of class action statutes that they may, constitutionally, explicitly authorize notice
by publication to known class members but only in situations dissimilar to the
facts involved in Mullane (involving substantial trust beneficiaries) and Schroeder (involving substantial property interests and eminent domain proceedings).
The special nature of the facts in these decisions is discussed in the text accompanying footnotes 149 through 160, supra. Otherwise such an authorization will
be held to violate the due process clause as interpreted in those cases. Of note
in this regard is the previously mentioned California Civil Code section 1781(d)
which does explicitly authorize notice by publication to known class members
and which is of a broader and more general character than might be permitted
by the Court's thoughts as revealed in the Eisen decision.
Before the Supreme Court, the plaintiff made the expectable arguments that
individual notice should not be required because the prohibitive expense would end the
suit as a class action and, in any case, since the class members' individual claims were
so small, no class member would choose to opt out in response to such notice. The
Court's short and blunt answer to both arguments was that individual notice is an
See 42 U.S.L.W. 4810. Significantly, the
unambiguous requirement of Rule 23.
Court again did not address itself to, or mention, due process requirements. Thus it
might again be inferred that Congressional draftsmen could amend Rule 23 to explicitly
allow published notice to known class members in class actions involving mass wrongs
or other types of fact situations different from those present in the Mullane and
Schroeder cases.
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argument that there is nothing in the Rule which authorizes it. Thus
absent due process obstacles, and we have already seen that there are
none, it appears that fluid class recovery is a device which naturally
and forcefully furthers the same basic policies which support class actions
in general. There is no reason not to accept the device in appropriate
cases, such as Eisen, and it should be adopted widely as a method
for computing class action damages in the future.
HI.

Conclusion
The above discussion analyzes three areas of controversy raised
by the Eisen III decision concerning the use of class action procedures.
The ultimate resolution of these three issues will, for the reasons indicated, determine the viability of class actions in mass wrong situations. Since such mass wrongs are a relatively common result of consumer abuse, and since public law enforcement must be complemented by effective private action, the vitality of mass wrong class action procedures is an imperative for adequate consumer protection in
our society.
On the three major issues decided in Eisen III, it is this author's
opinion that Judge Medina employed an incomplete and in some instances flatly incorrect analysis. These failings result from an outdated and incorrect concept of the resources, sophistication, and economic incentives of the respective parties to any litigation generated
by a mass wrong. This concept, which forms the mold for Judge
Medina's interpretation of the notice requirements of the due process
clause, should be discarded. A more flexible conception of the attributes and resources of actual or possible litigants needs to be substituted. Once this basic adjustment in thinking is accomplished, the
balancing process which each of the three issues requires becomes
far more reasonable and yields, on at least two of the issues, rather
clear answers.
First, the problem of what constitutes sufficient notice to satisfy
statutory and constitutional requirements involves a balancing of the
right of meaningful access to the courts together with the therapeutic
benefits from class litigation against the interest of the absent members
of the class in receiving notification of the existence of the action.
The latter interest is largely illusory for reasons discussed previously,
and is clearly overbalanced by the first two considerations. This being
the case, the judicial interpretation of the due process clause's notice
requirements should be lenient, and individual notice should not be
held required either by the due process clause or by Rule 23, since
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judicial discretion to implement dominant policies can be exercised
under both.
With respect to the problem of the allocation of notice costs, the
same considerations militate for a shifting of the burden from plaintiff
when the class claim is clearly meritorious. However important considerations of fairness support the position that defendant should not
be forced to bear part of the cost when, in the event he wins on the
merits, he will be unable to recoup his costs. Thus, the balancing
of the considerations in the abstract yields no conclusion applicable
in all cases. Accordingly, each case must be approached with a sensitivity to these considerations, and a result sought which seems to be
the fairest under the circumstances.
Finally, the fluid class recovery issue involves, on the one hand,
the therapeutic benefits of large class recoveries, and on the other,
the fiction that defendant is somehow prejudiced unconstitutionally by
his inability to confront and examine individual class members. Resolution of these competing considerations presents no problem, because
the latter is imaginary. The conclusion is that fluid class recovery
ought to be invariably allowed in order that class actions may serve
as a deterrent to dishonest and unfair business practices.
This consideration of the relationship between the requirements
of the due process clause and the field of consumer protection has
taken a distinctively negative view of the most recent precedent in the
field of class actions. However, the reader should not be left with
the idea that the author's attitude is unremittingly critical toward all
judicial applications of the due process clause in the area of consumer
protection, for indeed it is not. The realities of the consumer-seller
relationship are perceived in a realistic and enlightened manner in a
considerable number of recent due process decisions involving consumer protection issues. Those decisions deserve, and will receive,
our attention at a later date.

